

1976

**March 1976** - Ford suspends efforts to complete SALT II because of the election. (Garthoff, p. 801)

**August 1976** - ACDA Director Fred Ikle announces that the Soviets are deploying MIRVed SS-20 mobile IRBMs. (Garthoff, p. 856)

**September 1976** - With Carter's authorization, Averell Harriman tells Brezhnev that Carter will support SALT II and then move on to reduce strategic forces. (Garthoff, p. 802)

**September 13, 1976** - Carter tells *U.S. News & World Report* that the U.S. should be "tougher" in pursuing detente. (Garthoff, p. 564)

**September 29, 1976** - Carter praises the Jackson-Vanik amendment as a contribution to human rights and says that he had told Senator Jackson that he would act to "effectively implement" the amendment. Gromyko later cites the amendment as one of the conditions put on the Soviet Union by the United States that "slowed down many initiatives that would have smoothed Soviet-United States relations." (Gromyko, p. 293; Garthoff, pp. 569-570)

**October 1976** - In a campaign memorandum to Carter, Vance writes that U.S.-Soviet issues are important but "should not be permitted to so dominate our foreign policy that we neglect relationships with our allies and other important issues, as has been the case in the past. Our principal goal must be to bring about continuing reduction of tension." (Vance, p. 446)

**October 6, 1976** - During his foreign policy debate with Ford, Carter states that "The Soviet Union knows what they want in detente, and they've been getting it. We have not known what we wanted, and we've been out traded in almost every instance." (Garthoff, p. 564)

**November 1976** - Carter tells *Playboy* magazine that "the policy of detente has given up too much to the Soviet Union and gotten too little in return." He also criticizes Ford for abandoning the term detente. (Garthoff, p. 564)

**November 1976** - President-elect Carter sends a telegram of support to Soviet dissident Vladimir Slepak. (Garthoff, p. 568)

**November 4, 1976** - President-elect Carter in an oral message to Brezhnev, passed by Harriman through Dobrynin, says he considers it important for them to have an early personal meeting. Before the inauguration there were more exchanges through the same channel. (Kornienko)

**December 1976** - National Intelligence Estimate 11-3/8-76, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-1980s," is released. The study says that

current Soviet intentions could "be attributed to a combination of defensive prudence, superpower competitiveness, worst-case assumptions about US capabilities, a military doctrine which stresses war-fighting capabilities, and a variety of internal political and institutional factors." At the same time, the authors note that "the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet programs give rise to the question of whether the Soviet leaders now hold as an operative, practical objective the achievement of clear strategic superiority over the US." (NIE 11-3/8-76: *Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-1980s*, 12/76)

**December 1976** - "Team B," a group of military and civilian experts, produces an analysis entitled "Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View." CIA Director George Bush assigned the group to "take an independent look" at the data which went into the preparation of NIE 11-3/8 in order to "determine whether a good case could be made that Soviet strategic objectives are, in fact, more ambitious and therefore implicitly more threatening to U.S. security than they appear to the authors of the NIEs." Members of Team B, according to their report, were "deliberately selected" from among analysts "known to take a more somber view of the Soviet strategic threat" than the intelligence community as a whole. The team, led by Prof. Richard Pipes, records a number of criticisms of NIE 11-3/8, particularly its tendency toward "mirror-imaging," attributing expected U.S. forms of behavior to Soviet officials. This "conceptual flaw," the report notes, "is perhaps the single gravest cause of the misunderstanding of Soviet strategic objectives found in past and current NIEs." (*Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View*, 12/76)

**December 2, 1976** - Carter's spokesman, Jody Powell, discloses that Brezhnev has pledged in a private communication that the Soviet Union would "go out of its way to avoid any crisis with the United States" and the incoming administration. (Garthoff, p. 585)

**December 3, 1976** - Carter meets with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and criticizes Ford for not completing the SALT II agreement reached at Vladivostok. When SALT II is complete, he will begin to seek reductions of strategic forces. (Garthoff, p. 802)

**December 22, 1976** - Secretary of State-designate Cyrus Vance meets with exiled Soviet dissident Andrei Amalrik, who encourages the new administration to do more to encourage democratization in the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, p. 569)

**December 27, 1976** - Carter states that he would like to participate in a summit meeting before September 1977 to sign a new SALT agreement and discuss areas of common concern. (Garthoff, p. 585)

**December 29, 1976** - Through a TASS release, Brezhnev responds favorably to Carter's statement about a summit meeting. (Garthoff, p. 585)

1977

**January 1977** - General of the Army Nikolai V. Ogarkov becomes the senior military authority in the Soviet Union when he is made a marshall of the Soviet Union, chief of the General Staff and first deputy defense minister. (Garthoff, p. 586)

**January, 1977** - Christopher John Boyce and Andrew Daulton Lee are tried and convicted of espionage in Los Angeles. (Burrows, p. 183)

**January 1977** - In his final report to Congress, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld states that Soviet defense spending during the first half of the 1970s was at 4-5 percent and that it has increased since. "There appears to be an acceleration in the growth of Soviet defense outlays." He acknowledges that the strategic balance in warheads is 8,500 to 4,000 in the U.S.'s favor. (Garthoff, p. 794)

**January 6, 1977** - The Charter 77 organization is formed, and issues a declaration demanding recognition of the human rights promised in the Helsinki agreements. (Weschler, p. 217)

**Mid-January 1977** - In one of his last presidential decisions, Ford signs National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-345 directing the Pentagon to establish a workable antisatellite (ASAT) weapons system. (Garthoff, p. 759)

**January 18, 1977** - In a speech at Tula, Brezhnev states that the Soviet Union does not seek military superiority or any military capacity beyond what is sufficient for deterrence. The Soviet Union wants to prevent first and second nuclear strikes and avoid nuclear war completely. He endorses SALT and other arms control programs and defines the meaning of detente. "Detente is above all an overcoming of the 'cold war', a transition to normal, equal relations between states. Detente is a readiness to resolve differences and conflicts not by force, not by threats...but by peaceful means.... Detente is a certain trust and ability to take into account the legitimate interests of one another." (Garthoff, pp. 585-586, 771)

**January 20, 1977** - Jimmy Carter is inaugurated the 39th President of the United States. (NYT 1/21/77)

**January 24, 1977** - During a visit to the NATO Council, Vice President Mondale proposes increases in conventional forces and the development of an enhanced radiation (neutron) bomb. (Garthoff, p. 583)

**January 24, 1977** - Carter signs PRM-4, directing a study of SALT issues. (Richelson)

**January 25, 1977** - Carter signs PRM-16, directing a study of nuclear testing issues. (Richelson)

**January 26, 1977** - In a letter to Brezhnev, Carter acknowledges Brezhnev's statement at Tula and declares that the U.S. does not seek military superiority either. He states that he hopes to improve relations through a "rapid conclusion" of

SALT II, early agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and agreement on MBFR. Carter also expresses interest in an early summit meeting. (Garthoff, pp. 565, 802)

**January 27, 1977** - The State Department issues a statement in support of Andrei Sakharov, sparking accusations by Ambassador Dobrynin that the United States is interfering in Soviet internal affairs. Dobrynin tells Vance that support for Sakharov is an unwarranted intervention in Soviet domestic affairs. (Garthoff, pp. 569, 572)

**January 28, 1977** - Harold Brown forwards to the President a rapidly-prepared analysis of Carter's proposal that Washington and Moscow cut to 200-250 the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Drafted in conjunction with the Joint Staff and DOD's office of International Security Affairs, the paper raises a number of concerns about the effect of such reductions on deterrence, "crisis stability," "treaty stability," and other strategic issues. (*Implications of Major Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Forces*, 1/28/77)

**February 1, 1977** - In his first meeting with Dobrynin, Carter again says that he wants to reach a rapid agreement on a simple SALT II treaty, separating the cruise missile and Backfire issues from it. After SALT II, he wants to achieve major reductions in strategic forces, even cutting the number of missiles to "several hundred." (Brzezinski, p. 152)

**February 2, 1977** - Brzezinski provides Vance and Brown with a secret history of the SALT II negotiations under Presidents Nixon and Ford. The history, prepared by NSC staff member Roger Molander, describes the origins and scope of the Vladivostok agreement of November 1974 and subsequent efforts, including use of back channels, to resolve disputed issues. Among the contested items were verification of limits on MIRVs, ceilings on cruise missiles and the extent to which Soviet Backfire bombers should be included. Brzezinski cautions Vance and Brown to restrict tightly access to the history because the "SALT community" is generally unaware of the back channel communications between Nixon/Ford and Brezhnev. (*SALT Negotiating History*, 2/2/77)

**February 3, 1977** - A meeting of the Special Coordination Committee reviews SALT II options. Carter reaffirms his support for deep cuts in strategic systems and the participants agree on the need for a comprehensive agreement. The SCC commissions two working groups to develop alternative packages: one based on the Vladivostok agreement and the other based on significant reductions for both sides. (Brzezinski, p. 157)

**February 4, 1977** - Responding to Carter's letter of January 26, Brezhnev emphasizes the need for a quick SALT agreement based on the agreement at Vladivostok. He states that the achievement of disarmament is the "central area of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. at the present time." (Brzezinski, p. 153)

**February 4, 1977** - Carter meets with Sen. Jackson and both agree that it is desirable to press for substantial reductions in strategic forces under SALT II. (Garthoff, p. 803)

**February 5, 1977** - In *Pravda*, Georgi Arbatov delineates the strengths and weaknesses of both U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. He concludes that both sides are in "approximate balance" and that there is a "parity in the correlation of forces." (Garthoff, pp. 771-72)

**February 7, 1977** - The State Department expresses concern over the arrest four days earlier of Soviet dissident Alexander Ginzburg for currency violations. (Garthoff, p. 569)

**February 8, 1977** - In his first press conference, Carter states that the United States has "superior nuclear capability." He also acknowledges that the United States and the Soviet Union "are roughly equivalent" in that either country could "destroy a major part of the other nation." (Garthoff, p. 786)

**February 8, 1977** - During a news conference, Carter states that the U.S. has "superior nuclear capability." He also acknowledges that the U.S. and the Soviet Union "are roughly equivalent in that either could "destroy a major part of the other nation." Additionally, Carter comments that if the Soviets develop the ICBM. more, the U.S. will be unable to "pinpoint" the location of the Soviet ICBM. (Garthoff, p. 786; *Weekly Presidential News Conference*, PPP, Vol. I, 1977, p. 96)

**February 14, 1977** - Commenting on his second letter to Brezhnev, Carter writes in his diary that he wants the Soviets to "understand the commitment I have to human rights first of all, and that it is not an antagonistic attitude of mine toward the Soviet Union--and that I'm very sincere about my desire to reduce nuclear armaments." (Carter, p. 218)

**February 15, 1977** - Sen. Jackson provides Carter with a detailed SALT II proposal and recommends that the U.S. not "unnecessarily assume the burden of past mistakes" by simply starting with the Vladivostok agreement. (Garthoff, pp. 803-804)

**February 17, 1977** - Carter sends Sakharov a letter of support. (Garthoff, p. 569)

**February 18, 1977** - Carter signs PRM-10, directing a comprehensive net assessment and review of military force posture. (Richelson)

**February 18, 1977** - Responding to Brezhnev's note of February 4, Carter states that U.S.-Soviet competition is expensive and can "become very dangerous" and that checking it requires nuclear arms limitations and the "exercise of deliberate self-restraint in regard to...trouble spots...which could produce a direct confrontation." Regarding SALT, he refers to a quick agreement deferring cruise and Backfire issues or alternatively a more "comprehensive" one. As for human rights, the U.S. does not intend to "interfere in the internal affairs of other nations....But it will be necessary for our government to express publicly...the sincere and deep feelings of myself and our people." (Brzezinski, p. 154, Kornienko)

**February 20, 1977** - Tass states that U.S. support for Soviet dissidents would damage U.S.-Soviet relations. (Garthoff, p. 572)

**February 24, 1977** - Secretary of Defense Harold Brown testifies before Congress that the U.S. and Soviet Union have attained strategic parity. (Garthoff, p. 786)

**February 25, 1977** - Answering Carter's letter of February 8, Brezhnev asserts that a new SALT agreement must be based on Vladivostok. In response to Carter's comments on human rights, he states that the Soviets will not "allow interference in our internal affairs, whatever pseudo-humanitarian slogans are used to present it." (Brzezinski, p. 155)

**February 25, 1977** - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommends confirmation of Paul Warnke as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as chairman of the U.S. delegation to SALT. (Basic Documents, pp. 154-158)

**February 26, 1977** - After Vance denies the charge that the human rights campaign would hurt U.S.-Soviet relations, *Pravda* rebuts him. (Garthoff, p. 572)

**February 28, 1977** - While Vance sees the Brezhnev letter of February 25 as "good, hard hitting, to the point," Brzezinski sees it as a "very sharp rebuff." Carter tells him that the letter has taken him aback. (Brzezinski, p. 155)

**Early March 1977** - During an exchange with Carter on the "hot line," Brezhnev restates the Soviet commitment to Vladivostok. (Garthoff, p. 803)

**March 1977** - The Soviets agree to a U.S. proposal for ASAT negotiations but Washington takes another year to develop a position on the subject. (Garthoff, p. 759)

**March 1977** - Vance and Gromyko agree in Moscow to establish working groups on a comprehensive test ban and on nuclear non-proliferation. Initial working group discussions are planned to begin June 13. (*Discussions with the Soviet Union on Termination of Nuclear Explosions and on Nuclear Non-Proliferation*, 5/24/77, Kornienko)

**March 1, 1977** - During a White House meeting with exiled Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, Carter tells him that the U.S. has a "permanent" commitment to human rights. (Garthoff, p. 569)

**March 7, 1977** - Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher affirms the Administration's commitment to making human rights an important aspect of U.S. foreign policy. (*Statement by the Deputy Secretary of State before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance*, 3/7/77)

**March 10, 1977** - At an SCC meeting, Brzezinski proposes that a SALT agreement include an ICBM freeze. Harold Brown responds favorably to the suggestion because its purpose is to restrict Soviet ICBM modernization. (Brzezinski, p. 158)

**March 10, 1977** - After a bitter struggle in the Senate, Paul C. Warnke is confirmed as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). (Garthoff, p. 567)

**March 12, 1977** - At a White House meeting, Carter is impatient with "merely staying within the Vladivostok framework" for SALT and wants to develop a "fundamentally new kind of proposal." Brown requests deep cuts in force levels so as to reduce Soviet strategic advantages. (McLellan, p. 40)

**March 15, 1977** - In a letter to Carter, Brezhnev reminds him that SALT II should be "essentially a reflection of the Vladivostok understanding." (McLellan, p. 40)

**March 17, 1977** - During a U.N. General Assembly speech, Carter, commenting on human rights, stresses the importance of the "search for peace...[and] the search for justice" in the world. (Garthoff, p. 569; *U.N. General Assembly Speech*, PPP, Vol. I, 1977, p. 96)

**March 17, 1977** - JCS Chairman George Brown forwards to Harold Brown a memorandum outlining the Joint Chiefs' trepidations about Carter's earlier proposal to cut to 200-250 the number of strategic nuclear launchers in U.S. and Soviet arsenals. Referring to a DOD analysis the secretary of defense sent to Carter on January 28, 1977, (see entry), General Brown's memo goes somewhat further in suggesting some of the problems of undertaking such major reductions. Specifically, the JCS fear that the cuts: would undermine the deterrence value of strategic forces, might spur the Soviets to adopt a first-strike strategy, and could inadvertently raise the influence of other nuclear nations. (*Implications of Major Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Forces*, 3/17/77)

**March 19, 1977** - Carter and his chief advisers secretly agree on a new SALT approach, reportedly without taking into account the views of working level officials or intelligence experts. They agree on a proposal that departs significantly from the approach reached at Vladivostok by Ford. The proposal calls for reducing the overall equal aggregate of strategic missiles from the Vladivostok level of 2,400 to between 1,800 and 2,000, and the number of MIRVed launchers from 1,320 to 1,100 or 1,200. The cuts would mean a disproportionate reduction for the Soviets because all substantive reductions would come from the Soviet side. Other new features include: reducing the number of modern large ICBMs to 150 and the number of launchers with MIRVed ICBMs to 550; placing limits on ICBM and SLBM test firings; and imposing a 2,500-mile range for cruise missiles, allowing the virtual proliferation of land- and sea-based systems. The only U.S. concession will be to forego development of the MX. The U.S. would not include the Soviet Backfire Bomber in the aggregate if the Soviets do not increase its strategic potential. Vance and Warnke convince Carter to accept a fallback position based on Vladivostok but setting aside the controversial Backfire and cruise missile issues. NSC staff member William Hyland tells the policymakers that the new approach is ill-advised. (Garthoff, pp. 804-805, 806-807; Smith, p. 76)

**March 21, 1977** - During a speech, Brezhnev argues that U.S. human rights policy is an effort to "find some kind of force against socialism in our countries." At the same time he emphasizes the importance of detente. (Garthoff, p. 572)

**March 22, 1977** - At a meeting of the NSC, Carter leads a discussion of the new SALT proposal (see March 19 entry) in a way devised to secure support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his diary, Brzezinski writes that it was "stressed to [Vance]

that the Soviets are likely to reject and ridicule our proposals, but that he has to stand fast." (Brzezinski, p. 160)

**March 22, 1977** - Carter tells a Congressional group that criticisms of human rights practices would not impair U.S.-Soviet relations. He says that there is no need to worry "every time Brezhnev sneezes." (Garthoff, p. 572)

**March 24, 1977** - Carter asks Congress to appropriate funds that would allow Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to double their operations and Voice of America to increase by 25 percent its broadcasts to the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, p. 570)

**March 25, 1977** - In his diary, Brzezinski writes that if the U.S. is "not intimidated and keep[s] pressing, it is conceivable that the Soviets will come around and accept our first proposal, which in that case would mark a really significant turning point in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. If accepted, it would mean a true impediment to a continued arms race,...and an arrangement which by and large would ensure political and strategic stability as well as parity." (Brzezinski, p. 160)

**March 25, 1977** - Around this date, Vance briefs Dobrynin about the new U.S. SALT proposal. The Soviet ambassador warns him that it is likely to be rejected. (Vance, p. 52; Garthoff, p. 805)

**March 28, 1977** - At his first meeting with Vance, Brezhnev objects to continuing American "interference" in Soviet internal affairs over human rights policy. Later in the afternoon, Vance presents Gromyko with both the comprehensive and the deferral proposal, telling him that Carter strongly prefers the former. Gromyko, without Brezhnev present, pushes strongly for an agreement based on Vladivostok and reviews the Soviet interpretation of that agreement. They agree to establish working groups on a comprehensive test ban, anti-satellite weapons, Indian ocean demilitarization, prior notification on missile test firings, constraints on conventional arms transfers, a ban on radiological weapons, ban on chemical weapons, and civil defense. (Vance, pp. 52-54; Garthoff, p. 573)

**March 28, 1977** - Warned by Dobrynin that the new SALT proposal would be rejected, Vance arrives in Moscow where he presents the new SALT proposal (see March 19, 1977 entry) to Brezhnev. (McLellan, p. 41; Garthoff, p. 805)

**Late March 1977** - The White House produces Presidential Directive-7 (PD/NSC-7) on SALT. (Richelson)

**March 30, 1977** - Brezhnev rejects both the U.S. SALT proposal and the fallback position as steps backward from the progress made at Vladivostok. He tells Vance that the U.S. position is "one-sided" and "harmful to Soviet security." He believes that if the U.S. must reopen issues that were settled earlier then the Soviet Union will do the same, especially on issues involving Forward Based Systems in Europe. The Soviets assume that the U.S. would understand the need for a pledge that it would not expand its FBS or transfer strategic arms to allies. Vance and Gromyko agree to continue discussions in Geneva in May. Apparently, Brezhnev did not participate in the evaluation of the U.S. proposal, choosing to leave it to Gromyko, Ustinov and Andropov. He reportedly told them: "I appointed you to conduct the



talks yourselves and you ruined them." (Garthoff, p. 566, 807; Vance, p. 54; Arbatov, p. 207)

**March 30, 1977** - After the meeting with Brezhnev, Vance reports to Carter that the Soviets "have calculated, perhaps mistakenly, that pressure will build on us to take another position...In any case, we should not be discouraged." He holds a press conference and announces that the Soviets have found the U.S. proposals unacceptable and have made no offer of their own. (McLellan, p. 41; Garthoff, p. 808)

**March 30, 1977** - Following Brezhnev's rejection of the new U.S. SALT proposal, Carter quickly calls a press conference. He discloses some of the plan and states that it would accomplish a "fair, balanced, substantial reduction in the arms race." The proposed cuts, he declares, "would affect both of us about the same." To show progress, he announces the formation of eight U.S.-Soviet working groups on a comprehensive test ban, anti-satellite weapons, Indian ocean demilitarization, prior notification on missile test firings, constraints on conventional arms transfers, ban on radiological weapons, ban on chemical weapons, and civil defense. If agreement is not reached on the U.S. proposal, Washington will "consider a much more deep commitment to the development and deployment of additional weapons." (Garthoff, pp. 756, 809)

**March 30, 1977** - In his diary, Brzezinski writes that "if the American public stands fast and we do not get clobbered with the SALT issue, I think we can really put a lot of pressure on the Soviets." Because of the U.S. proposal for reductions and the human rights campaign, "I can well imagine that the Soviets feel in many respects hemmed in. However, all of that could begin to collapse if any of our colleagues begins to act weak-kneed and starts urging that we make concessions." (Brzezinski, p. 160)

**March 31, 1977** - Gromyko holds a press conference where he details the U.S. proposal and Soviet objections. He declares that "[o]ne cannot talk about stability when a new leadership arrives and crosses out all that has been achieved before." Constraints on ICBMs are unacceptable while there are no limits on numbers of cruise missiles. He also emphasizes the importance of the Forward Basing issue and the nontransfer of strategic missiles. He and Vance will have "plenty to talk about" when they meet in May. (Garthoff, pp. 809-811)

**April 1, 1977** - Before Vance returns, Brzezinski holds a press conference where he defends the U.S. proposal. If the Soviets agree to it, the U.S. would be willing to forego the MX, a weapon that could "be extremely threatening" to the Soviet Union during the early 1980s because it would provide "first strike capability against...land-based systems." (Garthoff, p. 810)

**April 3, 1977** - The Committee on the Present Danger issues a new warning on the Soviet nuclear threat. (Garthoff, p. 810)

**April 3, 1977** - Carter meets with Vance, Brzezinski, Warnke, *et al* to review the recent Moscow discussions. Brzezinski writes in his diary that Vance and Warnke "emphasized that the Soviets were quite cordial, in spite of their firm rejection." He believes that they do not recognize "the degree to which the Soviets are hostile to

our proposal and the extent to which they want to put us under pressure."  
(Brzezinski, p. 165)

**April 5, 1977** - Carter signs PRM-24, directing a study of the People's Republic of China. (Richelson)

**April 7, 1977** - Carter signs PRM-25, directing a study of arms control in the Indian Ocean. (Richelson)

**April 13, 1977** - Brzezinski publicly suggests a series of Soviet-U.S. summit meetings. (Garthoff, p. 574)

**April 14, 1977** - Vance chairs a Policy Review Committee meeting to discuss Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-9, "Comprehensive Review of European Issues." An inter-agency memorandum which came out of PRM-9 outlines four options for dealing with Eastern Europe: (a) differentiate more sharply among the countries of the region depending on their relative independence from the Soviet Union; (b) establish closer ties to those countries with more liberal internal policies; (c) limit ties with countries with less open internal policies; (d) broaden relations with all countries of the region. Brzezinski argues for the first approach, which favors "polycentrism" and regional pluralism, while others, including representatives from the State Department, advocate the last option. Vance ends the meeting by noting a general consensus on merging the first two approaches and directs that further studies be undertaken. (Brzezinski, pp. 296-297)

**April 14, 1977** - Carter announces the United States' intention to sign Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. (*President's Announcement on Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco*, 4/16/77)

**April 15, 1977** - Carter offers to meet with Brezhnev annually. He says that he sees no need to revise the U.S. SALT proposal. (Garthoff, p. 574)

**April 20, 1977** - The White House produces Presidential Directive-10 (PD/NSC-10), "Instructions for the Tenth Session of the Standing Consultative Commission." (Richelson)

**Late April 1977** - Vance and Warnke meet with Dobrynin and suggest a three-part package: a treaty lasting until 1985, with a weapons ceiling reduced from Vladivostok; an interim agreement for two-to-three years on difficult questions such as cruise missiles; and an agreement to deeper cuts and limitations on weapons development in SALT II. Dobrynin responds positively, suggesting that the third part be called a "declaration of principles." (Vance, p. 56)

**April 29, 1977** - Through a spokesperson, Brezhnev refuses to participate in any summit meetings until there is an agreement on SALT. (Garthoff, p. 575)

**May 1977** - At U.S. urging, members of NATO agree to increase military spending at an annual rate of 3 percent in real terms. Washington also begins an effort to upgrade NATO conventional forces, including U.S. reinforcement capabilities. (Garthoff, p. 583)

**May 14, 1977** - Carter signs PRM-26, directing a review of the ABM treaty. (Richelson)

**May 19, 1977** - During SALT discussions in Geneva, Vance formally proposes the three-part arrangement discussed with Dobrynin in late April and Gromyko quickly agrees. The package includes a three year ban on testing of any new ICBM types. Gromyko turns down a U.S. proposal to reduce heavy Soviet ICBMs from 308 to 190 and to place a moratorium on arming large ICBMs with MIRVs. He also insists that the proposal include the Vladivostok agreement on incorporating air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in the ceiling on MIRVs. In addition, Gromyko seeks an exception to the ban on new ICBM tests: the right to test a single-warhead ICBM to replace old versions. Vance also raises the issue of a Soviet role in facilitating a reconvened Geneva conference on the Middle East, in which the U.S. and the Soviets would be cochairmen. (Garthoff, pp. 580, 811, 816; Vance, pp. 56-57, 191)

**May 21, 1977** - At Geneva, Vance and Gromyko announce agreement that "elimination of the continuing source of tension in the Middle East constitutes one of the primary tasks in ensuring peace and international security." They agree to work toward resuming the Geneva Conference in the fall of 1977. (*Joint Communique Issued by the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Geneva, 5/21/77*)

**May 22, 1977** - In an address given at the commencement exercises at Notre Dame University, Carter states that his Administration's foreign policy goals vis-a-vis the Soviet Union include: freezing the further modernization and production of weapons, continuing reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, banning all nuclear testing, prohibiting chemical warfare, stopping the development of an attack capability against space satellites and limiting arms in the Indian Ocean. (*Address by the President at Commencement Exercises at Notre Dame University, 5/22/77*)

**May 26, 1977** - Carter signs Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Protocol requires all signatory nations responsible for territories within the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone to apply appropriate denuclearization measures to those territories. (CRS2, p. 35)

**Late May 1977** - Carter orders deployment of the Mark-12A warhead and NS 20 guidance system for use on 300 Minuteman III missiles. This step marks a major advance in the development of counterforce capabilities against Soviet ICBM silos and other hard targets. (Garthoff, p. 791)

**June 1977** - Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) talks begin on a tripartite basis (including the British) in Geneva. (Garthoff, p. 756)

**June 1977** - U.S.-Soviet talks on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean begin. (Garthoff, p. 762)

**June 1977** - Carter proposes the development of a neutron bomb. (Garthoff, p. 588)

**June 1977** - Soviet leaders inform Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps that because of credit and trade restrictions they intend to reduce sharply imports of

nonagricultural products from the U.S. The Soviets begin to turn toward Japan and Western Europe for industrial imports. (Garthoff, p. 589)

**June 1977** - At SALT talks in Geneva, the U.S. proposes reducing the overall Vladivostok aggregate level of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers from 2,400 to 2,160. 2,160 corresponds to the existing U.S. force level. The Soviets still insist on 2,400 as agreed to at Vladivostok. (Garthoff, p. 813)

**June 3, 1977** - The Soviets again tell the Carter Administration that a summit should not be held until there is an agreement on SALT. (Brzezinski, p. 166)

**June 7, 1977** - *The Washington Post* prints a story concerning U.S. plans to deploy the Neutron Bomb in Europe. (Brzezinski, pp. 301-307)

**June 7, 1977** - Tass states that Carter's human rights accusations are an "absurd and wild concoction" and that U.S. policy would damage U.S.-Soviet relations. (Garthoff, p. 573)

**June 9, 1977** - Carter writes Brezhnev proposing a summit for sustaining the U.S.-Soviet dialogue. (Garthoff, p. 575)

**June 10, 1977** - "Prospects for Eastern Europe," a CIA Intelligence Memorandum, is released. Among the document's main points are that "[u]nrest is likely to grow in Eastern Europe over the next three years," and that "Poland will be the most volatile [country]." (*Prospects for Eastern Europe*, 6/10/77)

**June 11, 1977** - The Soviets arrest and expel *Los Angeles Times* reporter Robert Toth on charges of receiving state secrets. A dissident scientist had given Toth a copy of a paper on parapsychology. (Garthoff, p. 571)

**June 16, 1977** - Brezhnev replaces Nikolai Podgorny as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Reportedly Podgorny had objected to efforts to strengthen detente. (Garthoff, pp. 586-587)

**June 30, 1977** - Carter states that he would like to meet with Brezhnev at a mutually acceptable time and place. He also announces that the U.S. will not produce the B-1 bomber but instead concentrate on long-range air-launched cruise missiles to be deployed on B-52 bombers. (Garthoff, pp. 575, 791)

**Early July 1977** - Carter, concerned about press criticism of the U.S.-Soviet stalemate, asks Brzezinski for a report on Administration efforts to improve the relationship. Brzezinski outlines such initiatives as the SALT II proposals and talks on such issues as the comprehensive test ban, the Indian Ocean, conventional arms transfers, etc. He concludes that the "foregoing scarcely supports the Soviet claim that we are putting obstacles in the way of improved relations or have embarked on some anti-Soviet course. We have already carried the ball while they have constantly complained in order to build pressure for concessions." (Brzezinski, p. 173)

**Summer 1977** - Increasingly, the Soviets begin to exile human rights activists rather than imprison them at home. (Garthoff, p. 571)

**July 1977** - Carter requests acceleration of cruise missile development. (Garthoff, p. 588)

**July 1977** - German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau warn that a fervent human rights campaign would harm prospects for detente. (Garthoff, p. 570)

**July 1977** - An Interagency Coordinating Committee on U.S.-Soviet Affairs is created to coordinate policy implementation. (Garthoff, p. 575)

**July 1, 1977** - After commenting on Soviet and Cuban military involvement in Africa, Vance says: "We will consider sympathetically appeals for assistance from states which are threatened by a buildup of foreign military equipment and advisers on their borders, in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa." (*Address by the Secretary of State before the Annual Convention of the NAACP, St. Louis, 7/1/77*)

**July 5, 1977** - Brezhnev writes Carter that the condition for a summit is a SALT agreement. (Garthoff, p. 575)

**July 12, 1977** - During a news conference, Carter says that Moscow is "exaggerating" its disagreement with Washington over human rights policy and that he will continue to raise controversial issues in American-Soviet relations. He comments that Soviet statements, publicly attacking Carter and the U.S., are "erroneous and ill-advised." (Garthoff, p. 573; *Weekly Presidential News Conference, PPP, Vol. II, 1977, p. 1235*)

**July 13, 1977** - At a luncheon for visiting West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the Chancellor is quoted as saying, "Brezhnev ... is promoting detente and ... needs our help." According to Brzezinski, Schmidt is anxious to act as intermediary in direct, private talks between Carter and the Soviet leader, an idea Brzezinski opposes. (Brzezinski, p. 307)

**July 21, 1977** - In a major speech at Charleston, South Carolina, Carter reiterates that the U.S. firmly supports its position on human rights. He asserts that "[p]art of the Soviet Union leaders' current attitude may be due to their apparent--and incorrect--belief that our concern for human rights is aimed specifically at them or is an attack on their vital interests." (Garthoff, p. 573; *Remarks at the 31st Annual Meeting of the Southern Legislative Conference, PPP, Volume II, 1977, pp. 1309-10*)

**July 28, 1977** - Warnke and Under Secretary Habib testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties. (Basic Documents, pp. 171-178)

**August 4, 1977** - Carter signs an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act calling for sanctions against countries improperly engaging in nuclear trade. (CRS3, p. 36)

**August 5, 1977** - On the last day of the preliminary meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the U.S. Commission issues a report that strongly criticizes the human rights record of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (Garthoff, p. 570)

**August 6, 1977** - The Soviet government informs Carter that a "Cosmos" satellite photograph reveals South African preparations to detonate a nuclear explosive in the Kalahari Desert. Carter orders an independent investigation which subsequently confirms the Soviet findings. Later, the Carter Administration warns South Africa against conducting a nuclear test. (WP 8/23/77; Spector1, p. 221)

**August 8, 1977** - The Soviet Union states that it is ready to cooperate with other states to block South Africa's creation of a nuclear arsenal which would threaten international peace and security. (WP 8/28/77; NYT 8/9/77)

**August 14, 1977** - Carter, Vance and Brzezinski hold strategy talks on the South African nuclear situation. Carter orders a message to be sent to Brezhnev on August 15 confirming that the United States also has sufficient evidence to suggest that South Africa is preparing for a nuclear test which would bear international consequences. (See September 22, 1979, entry.) (WP 8/28/77)

**August 18, 1977** - PRM-31 directs a study of U.S. technology export controls. (Richelson)

**August 23, 1977** - The Policy Review Committee meets to discuss an inter-agency study on U.S. alternatives toward Eastern Europe and the related Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Brzezinski pushes for a more confrontational approach toward the region, including a more assertive stance in CSCE. According to Brzezinski, State Department representatives at the meeting are "horrified" at the idea. Brzezinski later writes that his goal is to "stiffen their backs even if we end up adopting a policy which is more designed to achieve compromise." Brzezinski also notes that the meeting produces agreement on the need for a degree of differentiation in U.S. policy toward the region. (Brzezinski, p. 297)

**August 24, 1977** - Carter signs Presidential Directive (PD)-18, which reaffirms the basic goal of maintaining "essential equivalence" in the strategic balance with the Soviet Union. It also confirms a U.S. forward defense strategy in Europe and the decisions to maintain a rapid deployment force. PD-18 also endorses NSDM-242 (the Schlesinger doctrine on selective nuclear targeting) pending "further guidance for structuring the U.S. strategic position." If deterrence fails, the U.S. should have on hand a "secure reserve" of strategic forces for employment in the event of protracted nuclear war. U.S. military forces should be strong enough for retaliatory purposes, the document maintains, but also for ensuring that a nuclear war would end on the best possible terms for the U.S. In addition, Carter approves plans for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force. (Garthoff, pp. 788-789, 974; Brzezinski, pp. 177-178)

**August 29, 1977** - After Vance returns from talks with Arab and Israeli leaders, he meets with Dobrynin. The Soviets are interested in a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on the principles of a Middle East settlement that could be made when Gromyko is in New York for the U.N. General Assembly session later in September. Vance encourages this and requests that Gromyko forward his ideas about a co-chairman's statement. (Vance, pp. 191-192)

**September 1977-March 1978** - At various intervals, meetings of the CSCE occur in Belgrade. The Soviets and East European delegations try to reinforce detente through confidence building measures (e.g. arms control) while the U.S. emphasizes human rights issues. Reportedly the West Europeans are dissatisfied with the U.S. emphasis. (Garthoff, p. 764)

**September 1977** - Dobrynin and Vance meet a number of times to discuss the draft text of a statement on the Middle East. In the statement, the Soviets commit themselves to the goal of normal relations between the Arabs and Israelis and refrains from supporting an independent Palestinian state. While the Soviets wanted to include the phrase "legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people," the State Department convinces them to remove the word "national" from the statement. (Vance, pp. 192-193)

**September 1977** - While the U.S. and the Soviets are preparing a joint statement on the Middle East, Vance consults with Egyptian and Israeli diplomats about it. Because the text reflects U.S. views on withdrawal and Palestinian self-determination, Sadat is pleased with the statement while the Israelis are unenthusiastic. (Vance, p. 192)

**September 1977** - The Department of Agriculture surprises the State Department and White House by approving a Soviet purchase of 15 million tons of grain, which is seven million tons over the level agreed to by the Administration. Subsequently, the NSC staff clears all grain sales. (Garthoff, pp. 575-576).

**September 1977** - The White House produces Presidential Directive-20 (PD/NSC-20) on SALT. (Richelson)

**September 9, 1977** - The U.S. informs the Soviets that there are three issues that need to be settled: reduction in the Vladivostok ceilings, limits on heavy missiles and a sub-ceiling on the number of MIRVed ICBMs. In addition, because of the B-1 cancellation, SALT II must allow the U.S. to deploy a large number of bombers armed with ALCMs without cutting into its force of MIRVed missiles. (Vance, p. 59)

**September 10, 1977** - Vance meets with Dobrynin and asks for early responses to the questions raised the day before (see entry for September 9). He also gives Dobrynin a proposed statement that both countries would continue to observe the interim SALT I agreement during the SALT II talks. They agree that during Gromyko's visit later in the month a joint statement will be issued reaffirming the SALT I ABM treaty which is due for a review at the end of the year. (Vance, p. 59)

**September 13, 1977** - Carter signs PD-21 directing that U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe differentiate among those countries of the region which either conduct more open internal policies or are more independent of the Soviet Union. (Brzezinski, p. 297)

**September 17, 1977** - China conducts an atmospheric nuclear test. (FAC, p. 5)

**September 17, 1977** - Around this date, Dobrynin informs Vance that Moscow refuses to consider the U.S. proposal to reduce heavy missiles in exchange for a sub-

ceiling on ALCM-carrying bombers. Moscow considers the heavy missile issue closed. Dobrynin gives Vance a proposed Soviet unilateral declaration stating that Moscow will observe the SALT I Interim Agreement after October 3. (Vance, p. 59)

**September 21, 1977** - Vance prepares to meet with Gromyko to discuss the Soviet position on South African nuclear matters. Vance is to request "quiet cooperation" with the Soviets on this issue. (*Your Meeting with Gromyko: South African Nuclear Issue*, 9/21/77)

**September 22, 1977** - Gromyko and Vance meet in Washington to discuss SALT. Instead of focusing on the number of heavy ICBMs, Vance stresses limiting the number of all types of ICBMs with MIRVs. He proposes a subceiling of 800 ICBMs with MIRVs instead of the 550 mentioned in March. Gromyko and the Soviet military react negatively to this as well as to a proposal for a new limit of 250 on heavy bombers and heavy ICBMs, which would allow the U.S. to continue a program to arm B-52s with ALCMs but would force the Soviets to scrap their bomber force and reduce by 58 their stockpile of heavy ICBMs. Gromyko proposes lowering the limit on total strategic launchers from 2,400 to 2,250, which Vance counters with a proposal that this number be reduced a full 10% to 2160. Gromyko suggests lowering the sub-ceiling on MIRVed ICBMs to 820, but attaches the condition that there be no sub-ceiling on heavy missiles and that ALCMs mounted on heavy bombers be counted in the MIRV ceiling as agreed to at Vladivostok. In addition, Gromyko proposes that testing and deployment of SLCMs and GLCMs of range greater than 600 kilometers be banned, and that no new ICBMs without exception be tested or deployed for the period of the treaty. He also reads a proposed unilateral assurance that the Backfire bomber is not an intercontinental weapon and will not be given intercontinental capability. (*SALT*, 9/22/77; Garthoff, pp. 812-813; Vance, pp. 59-60)

**September 23, 1977** - Believing that Gromyko's concessions of the previous day represent important progress, Vance and Carter present the Soviet foreign minister with a counterproposal. They drop the separate heavy ICBM and heavy bomber subceilings and instead propose converting the ICBM ceiling of 1,320 agreed on at Vladivostok into a hybrid ceiling covering both MIRVed ICBMs and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. In addition they propose a ceiling of 1,200 on land- and sea-based launchers of MIRVed missiles. They also accept Gromyko's figure of 820 for launchers of MIRVed ICBMs. Because U.S. national technical means cannot distinguish between launchers of the single warhead SS-11 and the MIRVed SS-19, the Americans insist that all launchers that could take MIRVed missiles (such as those at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk) be counted in the MIRV ceiling, regardless of Soviet claims about the type of missile in the silo. Brzezinski believes that the Soviets were impressed with Carter because he was "very much on top of the data, well informed, quite skillful in shooting back immediately any Soviet argument." During a discussion of human rights, Gromyko belittles dissident Anatoly Shcharansky as "a microscopic dot who is of no consequence to anyone." (*SALT, Joint Communique, Joint and Separate Statements*, 9/23/77; Brzezinski, pp. 169-170; Garthoff, pp. 812-813; Carter, p. 220; Vance, p. 60; Smith, p. 68)

**September 27, 1977** - Carter and Vance hold another meeting with Gromyko. They agree to honor SALT I until SALT II has been put into effect. The Soviets agree to



a reduction in the overall launcher ceiling of 2,400 contained in the Vladivostok agreement. Gromyko accepts the hybrid ceiling of 1,320 for launchers of MIRVed missiles and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers as well as a separate ceiling of 1,250 on launchers of MIRVed missiles (instead of the 1200 proposed by the U.S.). This is a major Soviet concession because it imposes limits on their MIRV program. Gromyko also accepts a limit on ICBM launchers with MIRVs of 820. The limit on large ICBMs remains at the existing level (308 for the Soviets, none for the U.S.). Disagreements on Backfire, cruise missile limits and alleged SALT I violations prevent a quick agreement in the fall of 1977. (Vance, p. 61; Carter, p. 221; Garthoff, pp. 813-814)

**Fall 1977** - Soviet tests of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs indicate better accuracy increasing their capacity to hit U.S. hard targets. (Garthoff, p. 791)

**Early October 1977** - Brown discloses that the Soviets have developed a minor ASAT capability. (Garthoff, p. 760)

**October 1977** - For the first time, Brezhnev is identified as supreme commander-in-chief of Soviet armed forces. (Garthoff, p. 781)

**October 1977** - Abandoning its earlier proposal for complete demilitarization of the Indian ocean, the U.S. proposes that both sides maintain current levels of naval forces and to abjure from changes in deployments or development of new bases. (Garthoff, p. 762)

**October 1977** - Carter predicts an agreement on SALT within "a few weeks." (Garthoff, p. 584)

**October 1, 1977** - Following meetings in New York, Vance and Gromyko release a statement urging "a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict" within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference. Among other goals, the two governments seek participation of all parties to the conflict, including Palestinians, and guarantees for secure borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The statement adds: "In their capacity as cochairmen of the Geneva conference, the United States and the USSR affirm their intention, through joint efforts and in their contacts with the parties concerned, to facilitate in every way the resumption of the work of the conference not later than December 1977." This announcement comes as a surprise and is strongly attacked by pro-Israeli Americans; as a result, the peace process is stalemated. (*Joint Statement by the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister, New York, 10/1/77*; Garthoff, pp. 580-581)

**October 6, 1977** - Carter approves Presidential Directive 21 on Eastern Europe, which Brzezinski has formulated. The U.S. would reward Eastern European countries that demonstrate greater independence from Moscow or undertake steps toward internal liberalization. (Note: Raymond Garthoff places the date of PD-21 in September.) (Garthoff, p. 574; Richelson)

**October 11, 1977** - The White House produces Presidential Directive-22 (PD/NSC-22), "ABM Treaty Review." (Richelson)

**November 1977** - At the Belgrade meetings of the CSCE, the U.S. strongly challenges the human rights performance of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Also during the talks, the Eastern European delegations support a proposal for no-first-use of nuclear weapons. (Garthoff, pp. 570, 764)

**November 1977** - As a concession in the CTB talks, the Soviets accept a proposal for a treaty of indefinite duration. Brezhnev also announces a unilateral moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions. Moreover, the chief of the Soviet delegation tells Warnke that Moscow is ready to accept U.S. terms for verification through national seismic stations on each other's territory as well as thorough on-site inspection arrangements. (Garthoff, pp. 756-757)

**November 1977** - The Soviets and Americans hold a five-year review conference of the ABM treaty; neither side calls for reconsideration of the agreement. (Garthoff, p. 794)

**November 3, 1977** - Brezhnev writes in *Pravda* that the Soviet Union does not want to "upset the approximate balance of military power existing at present...between the USSR and the United States. But in return we must insist that no one else should seek to upset it in his favor." The Soviets do not want to maintain the balance for its own sake and support "starting a downward turn in the curve of the arms race" so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat of nuclear war. (Garthoff, pp. 772-773)

**November 18, 1977** - The first test flight in the Pershing II program occurs. If deployed in Europe for striking Soviet targets, this system would have a flight time from target to destination of between six to ten minutes in contrast to the 25-to-35 minute flight time for U.S. ICBMs targeted against the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, pp. 799, 882)

**November 18, 1977** - The White House produces Presidential Directive-23 (PD/NSC-23), "Standing Consultative Commission." (Richelson)

**November 21, 1977** - The U.S.-USSR Standing Consultative Commission on the 1972 ABM Treaty completes its five-year review of the treaty, and issues a joint statement reaffirming the U.S.-Soviet commitment to that treaty. (Basic Documents, pp. 183-184)

**December 1977** - At the NATO ministerial meeting, Vance proposes East-West talks on Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces and suggests the creation of a NATO forum to discuss this question. (Garthoff, p. 857)

**December 1977** - Melvin Laird publishes an article in "Reader's Digest" charging that there has been an official U.S. cover-up of Soviet cheating under SALT I. (Garthoff, p. 784)

**December 14, 1977** - During a meeting with Dobrynin, Brzezinski presses him on the Soviet role in Ethiopia. Unless Soviet and Cuban war materiel stops flowing into the country, the U.S. will "stop restraining" neighboring countries from sending in troops. Dobrynin "gave me assurances that Ethiopians will not cross the Somali

frontier once they begin to recapture the Ogaden." He also expresses concern that SALT will not be ratified. (Brzezinski, pp. 179-180)

**December 22, 1977** - The White House produces Presidential Directive-25 (PD/NSC-25), "Scientific or Technological Experiments with Possible Large Scale Adverse Environmental Effects and Launch of Nuclear Systems into Space." (Richelson)

**December 24, 1977** - During an interview, Brezhnev is critical of the U.S. for excluding Moscow from participation in the Middle East peace process. (Garthoff, p. 582)

**Late December 1977** - In a letter to Brezhnev, Brzezinski inserts a note expressing the "hope that the United States and the Soviet Union could collaborate in making certain that regional African disputes do not escalate into major international conflicts....I deeply believe that it is important for us, to the extent that it is possible, to avoid becoming involved in regional conflicts either as direct protagonists or through proxies...." (Brzezinski, p. 180)

**December 25-26, 1977** - In statements in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, the Soviet Union assails the Begin-Sadat summit. (Sobel, p. 189)

**December 28, 1977** - Carter guarantees a SALT agreement within "this coming year." (Garthoff, p. 584)

**Late December 1977** - The first Soviet SS-20 unit becomes operational. Brzezinski's deputy, David Aaron, and Pentagon officials meet with European defense officials to reassure them that additional weapons systems are not needed to counter the SS-20. (Garthoff, pp. 856-56)

**December 29, 1977** - Carter begins a six-nation trip that includes Poland. He affirms the strength of the Polish-American relationship and appeals for a more universal recognition of human rights. (*Replies by the President to Questions Asked at a News Conference, Warsaw, 12/30/77*; FAC, p. 2; NYT 12/30/77)

**December 30, 1977** - Brzezinski and Rosalynn Carter visit Polish Cardinal Wyszynski bearing a handwritten letter from the President. (Brzezinski, p. 298)

1978

**Early 1978** - Carter accepts a State Department proposal that the CAT negotiations include discussions of specific geographic regions in order to use the talks to get the Soviets involved in talks on restraining activity in the Third world. (Garthoff, p. 761)

**Early 1978** - Vance and Warnke propose that Carter approve that the U.S. present the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament with a proposal for negotiations on a cutoff of production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons for presentation. Reportedly, Brzezinski sidetracks the proposal by routing it to Energy Secretary Schlesinger who strongly criticizes it. (Garthoff, p. 763)

**Early January 1978** - Vance and Warnke propose to Carter that all SALT problems still at issue be resolved by the spring of 1978. (Brzezinski, p. 170)

**January 1978** - Gromyko proposes a joint U.S.-Soviet mediation effort to deal with the problems in the Horn of Africa; the United States dismisses the proposal because it would, according to Brzezinski, serve to "legitimize the Soviet presence in the Horn." (Brzezinski, pp. 180-181)

**January 5, 1978** - In a letter to Carter, Brezhnev strongly protests against plans to produce and deploy neutron weapons in Western Europe. (Kornienko)

**January 6, 1978** - At NATO headquarters in Brussels, Carter promises that "as SALT II proceeds towards an agreement, we will intensify our consultations with all of you." (*Address by the President Before the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 1/7/78*)

**January 9, 1978** - SALT talks resume in Geneva. (FAC, p. 4)

**January 11, 1978** - In a memo to Carter, Brzezinski repeats his concern about the Soviet presence in Ethiopia and suggests that the U.S. has to find ways to make the war in Ethiopia more costly to Moscow in political and military terms. (Brzezinski, p. 181)

**January 11, 1978** - The White House produces Presidential Directive-26 (PD/NSC-26), "Nuclear Weapons Stockpile." (Richelson)

**January 12, 1978** - Carter expresses "concern about the Soviet Union's unwarranted involvement in Africa" and expresses the "hope that we can induce the Soviets and Cubans not to send either soldiers or weapons to that area." (Garthoff, p. 591)---

**January 12, 1978** - Brezhnev writes Carter a letter, concerning SALT, other arms control issues and the Middle East. (Garrison, Kornienko)

**January 16, 1978** - A new "hot line" agreement goes into operation, replacing the system established in 1963. (FAC, p. 4)

**January 17, 1978** - In Belgrade, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review meeting. (FAC, p. 7)

**January 19, 1978** - In retaliation for the expulsion of a U.S. Embassy aide from Moscow, the United States expels two Soviet officials. (FAC, p. 6)

**January 23, 1978** - Brezhnev warns NATO against introducing a neutron bomb. (NYT 1/24/78)

**January 23, 1978** - Carter releases his January 20 budget message requesting \$500.2 billion for FY 1979 and setting defense spending at \$117.8 billion. (NYT 1/24/78)

**January 23-March 21, 1978** - Great Britain, the United States and the USSR meet in Geneva to discuss the comprehensive test ban. (FAC, p. 4)

**January 25, 1978** - Carter responds to Brezhnev's letters of January 5 and January 12 covering SALT and the neutron bomb, and clearly referring to a secret deal in the Middle East. (Garrison, Kornienko)

**Late January-Early February 1978** - With the support of Soviet and Cuban troops and advisers, Ethiopia begins a counteroffensive against Somali troops in the Ogaden. (McLellan, p. 49; Garthoff, p. 641)

**February 1978** - Members of the NATO High Level Group (HLG) on TNF modernization reach agreement on the need for a program to update TNF forces including a capability to strike targets inside the Soviet Union. U.S. participants do not oppose this development but also did not expect it. (Garthoff, p. 858)

**February 1978** - NSC staffer David Aaron meets with the Europeans to discuss possible deployment of enhanced radiation weapons (neutron bombs). After he returns, Brzezinski reports to Carter that the West Germans were willing to "support deployment of the neutron bomb should an arms control initiative not work out." Because of domestic opposition, the British Labor Government is even more hesitant to support a decision to produce and deploy neutron bombs. (Carter, p. 226)

**February 1, 1978** - By a vote of 58-37, the Senate blocks the amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations Act calling for the use of \$462 million in unspent funds for the B-1 bomber. On February 22, by a vote of 234-182, the House does the same. (FAC, p. 1)

**February 2, 1978** - In his first report to Congress, Secretary of Defense Brown states that the "present disparity in defense spending between the United States and the Soviet Union--and still more the trend--is disquieting as an index of both Soviet capabilities and Soviet intentions." He points out that there has been a steady increase in Soviet military spending for more than 15 years. He also states that Chinese military capabilities are a "strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union." Nevertheless, the defense budget Brown presents, which provides for a 2.7 percent real increase in annual spending in FY 1983, reflects the Carter Administration's decision to downgrade estimates of the Soviet threat and to not match the first strike

capability of the USSR against land-based missiles. (Garthoff, pp. 715, 794; FAC, p. 1; NYT 2/5/78)

**February 7, 1978** - The White House produces Presidential Directive-29 (PD/NSC-29), "Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization FY 79." (Richelson)

**February 14, 1978** - Dobrynin assures Vance that Ethiopian forces would not cross the Somali border after they recaptured the Ogaden. (McLellan, p. 50)

**February 17, 1978** - In a memo to Carter, Brzezinski writes that "[w]ith major decisions ahead on SALT, the Horn, the P.R.C., I conclude that the Soviets are seeking a selective detente. U.S. actions should seek to maintain the emerging cooperative relationship in certain 'benign' areas, while increasing the costs of Soviet behavior in the 'malignant' areas." (Brzezinski, pp. 560-561)

**February 17, 1978** - PD/NSC-30, "Human Rights," is issued. The document makes reduction of worldwide human rights violations a goal of U.S. foreign policy. (Richelson)

**February 21, 1978** - At a Special Coordination Committee meeting, Brzezinski links Soviet actions in Africa to progress on the SALT Treaty. Vance and Brown oppose the notion, and the Committee recommends that there be "no direct linkage between Soviet and Cuban actions in the Horn and bilateral activities involving either country and the United States." (Brzezinski, pp. 181-184)

**February 23, 1978** - Carter sends four human rights conventions to the Senate. (FAC, p. 1)

**February 24, 1978** - In a speech before the Supreme Soviet, Brezhnev states that there is an open road for further improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations but that certain "forces" in the U.S. oppose the relaxation of tensions. Tacitly criticizing the Carter Administration, he declares that the Soviet position on SALT has been "consistent and definite." He emphasizes the importance of quick agreement on SALT in order to move forward with military detente. He mentions "well known decisions" of the U.S. Congress that impede economic and scientific cooperation. (Garthoff, p. 592-593; NYT 2/25/78)

**February 25, 1978** - In reply to Brezhnev's critique of February 24, the State Department warns the Soviets that their role in Africa may endanger relations. (FAC, p. 6)

**February 27, 1978** - Brezhnev writes Carter a letter on SALT, the neutron bomb, other arms control issues, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. (Garrison, Kornienko)

**February 27, 1978** - Carter meets with Dobrynin. He writes in his diary that the essence of the discussion was the "fundamental importance of our relationship with the Soviet Union" and his concern about "the deterioration of the situation in recent months." (Carter, pp. 237-238)

**February 28, 1978** - The State Department releases a Senate Foreign Relations Committee finding that the USSR has generally complied with the 1972 SALT agreements. (NYT 3/1/78)

**March 1978** - Brezhnev and Defense Minister Ustinov visit the Soviet Far East where they stress the need for military defense against China. (Garthoff, p. 599)

**March 1978** - William Kampiles, a watch officer at the CIA's Operations Center, sells a copy of the technical manual for the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite to the KGB for \$3,000. He is later convicted of espionage and sentenced to a 40-year jail term. (Ranelagh, pp. 668-669)

**March 1, 1978** - Brzezinski complains about Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa stating that it would "inevitably complicate SALT." The next day, *Pravda* accuses him of "crude blackmail." (Garthoff, p. 592; NYT 3/2/78)

**March 2, 1978** - During a Special Coordination Committee meeting, Vance insists that there is no linkage between SALT and the Horn of Africa. Brzezinski observes that "Soviet actions may impose such linkage" by poisoning the atmosphere. Brown and Vance both disagree, with Vance arguing that "[w]e will end up losing SALT and that will be the worst thing that could happen." (Brzezinski, pp. 185-186)

**March 2, 1978** - Apparently because Vance disagrees with Brzezinski, Carter disclaims any linkages between SALT or test ban negotiations and Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa. He states that Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa "would make it more difficult to ratify a SALT agreement...and therefore the two are linked because of actions by the Soviets. We don't initiate the linkage." (Garthoff, p. 592; *Reply by the President to a Question Asked at a News Conference*, 3/2/78)

**March 3, 1978** - Brzezinski writes Carter that the "Soviets must be made to realize that detente...has to be both comprehensive and reciprocal. If the Soviets are allowed to feel that they can use military force in one part of the world--and yet to maintain cooperative relations in other areas--then they have no incentive to exercise any restraint." (Brzezinski, p. 186)

**March 3, 1978** - Carter states that "good and steady progress" is occurring on SALT and that ultimately it will be necessary for him to meet with Brezhnev. He adds that he will continue to urge the Soviet Union to fully respect human rights. (Garthoff, p. 593; *White House Statement On Belgrade Review Conference*, PPP, Vol. I, 1978, pp. 453-4)

**March 6-9, 1978** - President of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito visits Washington. In a joint statement issued on March 9, Carter and Tito agree that there has been an improvement in bilateral relations over the last year and stress the importance of such efforts to limit the arms race as SALT, the mutual and balanced force reductions talks and the forthcoming special session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament. (*Joint Statement Issued by the President and the President of Yugoslavia, Washington, D.C., 3/9/78*)

**March 10, 1978** - Carter signs into law the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242). The Act prohibits U.S. exports of nuclear fuel and reactors after March 1980 to nations which have not accepted full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities unless the President issues a waiver of this requirement. (*Statement by the President on Signing H.R. 8638 Into Law, Washington, D.C., 3/10/78; Spector2, p. 39; SIPRI, p. 201; CRS3, p. 1*)

**March 15, 1978** - The Chinese conduct an atmospheric nuclear test, its first since September 17, 1977. (FAC, p-5)

**March 16, 1978** - At the MBFR talks in Vienna, NATO and the Warsaw Pact agree on procedures for estimating manpower. (FAC, p. 7)

**March 16, 1978** - Vance meets with Dobrynin but has not seen the final text of a seemingly hard line speech (see March 17, 1978, entry) that Carter will deliver at Wake Forest. The next day Dobrynin is en route to Moscow. (Garthoff, p. 594)

**March 17, 1978** - During a speech at Wake Forest College, Carter emphasizes the Soviet military build-up which gives Moscow "functional equivalence in strategic forces with the United States." Noting his obligation to expand U.S. military forces, Carter states that "We will match...any threatening power...We will not allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us." The U.S. intends to strengthen its forces in Europe and mentions the "excessive" Soviet build-up there "beyond a level necessary for defense." He also mentions an "ominous inclination on the part of the Soviet Union to use its military power--to intervene in local conflicts...as we can observe today in Africa." The U.S. will not sign any SALT agreement that does not "preserve the strategic balance," cannot be independently verified and does not preserve U.S. military strength. Cooperation with the Soviet Union is possible but popular support for cooperation will decline if the Soviets fail to curb their military build-up or military activities in other countries. Subsequent briefings disclose that the speech was intended to counter opponents of SALT as well as to warn Moscow. (*Address by the President at Wake Forest University, 3/17/78; NYT 3/18/78; Garthoff, pp. 593-594*)

**March 22, 1978** - The Soviet Union reacts to the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, noting that as a member of the London Suppliers Club, Moscow fully supports the control of nuclear materials, "will strictly observe the principles of non-proliferation, and welcomes the 1978 Non-Proliferation Act insofar as it advances these principles." (*Soviet Official's Reaction to U.S. Non-Proliferation Act, 3/22/78*)

**April 1978** - The U.S. proposes a bilateral ban on the development of new ICBM systems. (Garthoff, p. 814)

**April 1978** - The NATO High Level Group (HLG) continues to discuss TNF modernization, with the U.S. providing data on possible weapons systems. (Garthoff, p. 858)

**April 1978** - U.S. newspapers begin to feature stories about policy disagreements between Vance and Brzezinski. (Garthoff, p. 597)



**Early April 1978** - In a report to Carter, Brzezinski criticizes the Vance-Warnke emphasis on SALT as a way to promote a more comprehensive U.S.-Soviet relationship. He argues that "it is clearly in the Soviet interest, and part of Soviet strategy, to focus attention on SALT.... This leaves the Soviets free to pursue their political objectives elsewhere....[Unless] detente becomes comprehensive and reciprocal we face an increasing rebellion at home, and SALT will not be ratified." He proposes measures such as encouraging worldwide condemnation of the Soviet role in Africa, taking a more forthcoming approach toward Congressional pressure for defense spending increases and developing a technology assistance program for China. (Brzezinski, p. 317)

**April 7, 1978** - Brezhnev reacts to Carter's Wake Forest speech by criticizing "forces interested in the arms race and in charging an atmosphere of fear and hostility." He criticizes the U.S. government for "indecisiveness and inconsistency" and for "glancing back at those circles which [oppose] agreement and are doing everything to undermine it and free their hands for an uncontrolled arms race." Unless a SALT agreement is reached soon, all opportunity for an agreement would be lost. (Garthoff, p. 595)

**April 7, 1978** - Carter announces that he has "decided to defer the production of weapons with enhanced radiation effects [a neutron bomb]," but that U.S. actions will be influenced by the Soviet Union's efforts in conventional and nuclear arms control. (*Statement by the President, Washington, D.C., 4/7/78*; CRS2, p. 42)

**April 7, 1978** - Brzezinski reads a presidential directive concerning Eritrea (possibly PD-32, see February 24, 1978, entry) at a Special Coordination Committee meeting. Its instructions include: "Support a negotiated solution more strongly. Repeated public statements deploring violence and foreign military involvement. Let any foreign assistance to insurgents continue without our involvement." (*The Horn of Africa, Angola and Rhodesia, 4/7/78*)

**April 10, 1978** - U.N. Under Secretary-General for Political and Security Affairs Arkady Shevchenko defects. (NYT 4/11/78)

**April 10, 1978** - Vance confirms Soviet agreement to negotiate the suspension of hunter-killer satellite (ASAT) tests and discuss conventional arms sales. (FAC, p. 5)

**April 10, 1978** - Carter is receptive to Brzezinski's paper (see Early April 1978 entry) and agrees that Vance should be instructed to present "toughly stated overall analysis of the U.S.-Soviet relationship" in his forthcoming talks with Gromyko. (Brzezinski, pp. 317-318)

**April 13, 1978** - In a joint declaration following meetings in Washington, Carter and Romanian leader Ceausescu express a determination "to strengthen and make irreversible the process of detente in Europe and throughout the world" and "to act resolutely for the adoption of a wide range of disarmament measures." (*Joint Declaration by the President and the President of Romania, Washington, D.C., 4/13/78*)

**April 14, 1978** - In a weekly report to the President, Brzezinski writes about his concerns that "attacks on SALT will intensify between the treaty signature and

delayed ratification. The process can be helped along if you take some decisions conveying toughness: MX, trade cutoffs to Soviets on petroleum technology, trade-off proposal on the neutron weapon, or open access to the P.R.C. on technology." (Brzezinski, p. 561)

**April 18-19, 1978** - In Copenhagen, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) decides to keep the option of introducing a neutron bomb in Europe open. (NYT 4/20/78)

**April 19, 1978** - The MBFR recesses for four months. (FAC, p. 7)

**April 19, 1978** - In a meeting between Angolan President Neto and Brezhnev, the USSR pledges to continue support for Angola. (NYT 4/20/78)

**April 20-22, 1978** - Vance meets with Gromyko in Moscow to discuss SALT. The harsher public rhetoric and talk about linkage have eroded the negotiating atmosphere and disagreements on major issues are not resolved. Some issues, however, are settled. The Soviets accept the U.S. figure of 1,200 missile launchers with MIRVs and the Soviet second stage aggregate figure of 2,250. In addition, Vance proposes a ban on any new ICBM systems during the three years of the protocol and then a limit of one new ICBM system until 1985. No agreement is reached either on what types of ICBMs should be exempted from the freeze or on the Backfire. (Brzezinski, p. 171; Garthoff, p. 815, 816; Vance, pp. 99-100)

**April 25, 1978** - In a speech, Brezhnev defends Soviet intervention in the third world, arguing that there is no contradiction between detente and Soviet relations with "countries liberated from colonialism." Charges that the Soviet Union has a "policy of expansion" are a "fabrication." He strongly supports detente and arms control and declares that in spite of "current oscillation," detente is the basis of relations with the U.S. (Garthoff, p. 596)

**May 1978** - Under pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the weapons laboratories and critics of detente, the U.S. backs away from its original proposal for an unlimited comprehensive test ban (CTB) after the Soviets have accepted it. Instead, Washington suggests a five-year comprehensive test ban. (Garthoff, p. 757)

**May 1978** - The Soviets unilaterally suspend ASAT testing until April 1980. This month and next, the U.S. and Soviet Union begin a two-year-long series of negotiations on the limitation of ASAT. (Garthoff, p. 759-61)

**May-July 1978** - A series of visits to the Soviet Union by U.S. officials and scientific delegations are canceled to protest Soviet actions to check internal dissidence through arrests and trials. (Garthoff, p. 610)

**May 3, 1978** - Several Republican Senators attack the Carter Administration for a "frightening pattern of giving up key U.S. weapons systems for nothing in return." (Vance, p. 100)

**May 4, 1978** - In Spokane, Washington, Carter denounces Soviet intervention in Africa but praises Moscow for bargaining in "good faith" at the SALT talks. (NYT 5/6/78)

**May 9, 1978** - Chinese-Soviet border tensions lead to a brief Soviet incursion into Manchuria. (Garthoff, p. 599)

**May 12, 1978** - Carter attacks Cuba for intervention in Africa, human rights violations and subservience to the USSR. (NYT 5/14/78)

**May 12, 1978** - Vance addresses the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs on "issues facing the United States in Africa." Vance notes the United States' "active support for majority rule and racial equality in southern Africa" but indicates that the challenge facing the United States is the successful promotion of peaceful change. According to Vance, the United States must continue to work for "negotiated settlements in southern Africa" but warns that bilateral relations with South Africa will deteriorate if no progress is made. (Basic Documents, pp. 1141-1145)

**May 18, 1978** - In a trial that began on May 15, Physicist Yuri Orlov is sentenced to seven years in prison and five years of enforced residence for anti-Soviet agitation. (FAC, p. 6; NYT 5/19/78)

**May 20, 1978** - Two Soviet U.N. employees, Rudolph Chernyayev and Valdik Enger, are arrested for espionage activities. Over CIA and State Department objections, they are later tried and sentenced to 50-year prison terms. (Garthoff, p. 613)

**May 21-23, 1978** - Brzezinski visits Beijing for talks with Chinese leaders about U.S. strategic plans, technological assistance, plans for countering Soviet policy and political collaboration in Africa and other areas. Carter has instructed Brzezinski to tell the Chinese that the U.S. has "made up its mind" to begin a "new phase in the American-Chinese relationship." During his mission, Brzezinski talks about the "polar bear" to the north and states that the Soviets support "international marauders" in Africa. In his banquet toast, Brzezinski states that "[o]nly those aspiring to dominate others have any reason to fear the further development of American-Chinese relations." (Garthoff, pp. 599, 702; Brzezinski, pp. 209-219)

**May 23, 1978** - PRM-36, "Soviet/Cuban Presence in Africa," directs that a review be undertaken of U.S. policy toward such presence. (Richelson)

**May 24, 1978** - Vice President Mondale presents a "Program of Action on Arms Control" before the U.N. General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament. (Basic Documents, p. 190)

**May 24, 1978** - The USSR tests a hunter-killer satellite. (FAC, p. 5) ---

**May 25, 1978** - In a statement about the Zaire invasion, Carter charges that Cuba knew of the Katangan plans to invade and did nothing and that Angola bears a heavy responsibility for the attack. (*Statement by the President at a News Conference, Chicago, 5/25/78*)

**May 26, 1978** - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee asks Carter for proof of his allegations about Cuba's foreknowledge of the Zaire invasion. (NYT 5/27/78)

**May 27, 1978** - At a White House meeting, Gromyko presents a major concession on SALT: agreement to freeze the number of warheads that could be deployed on various types of ICBMs. This "fractionization freeze" means that the Soviets can deploy no more than 10 warheads on each SS-18 ICBM rather than the 20-to-30 warheads that the missile is capable of carrying. The same freeze applies to SS-17 and SS-19 intercontinental missiles. Carter accuses the Soviets of directing military operations during the Katangese foray into Zaire. Gromyko makes Carter furious by denying the charge, saying that it is a "myth" and that the U.S. information is "fantastic." They also debate human rights issues. (Garthoff, pp. 596, 600; Vance, p. 103; *SALT, CTB, Africa, Human Rights*, 5/27/78)

**May 28, 1978** - Brzezinski supports Carter's accusation about Soviet involvement in Zaire and states that the Soviet Union is interventionist throughout the third world. "This pattern of behavior" is incompatible "with what was once called the code of detente." (Garthoff, p. 597)

**May 29, 1978** - Vance writes Carter a memorandum requesting a review of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. Trying to prevent a change in policy toward Moscow, he states that "we are coming to the point where there is a growing pressure on the part of some people to portray the competitive aspects of the relationship as taking clear precedence over the search for areas of cooperation." He argues that some U.S. policies could promote tough Soviet actions to which the U.S. would have to respond. For example, human rights policy could cause the Soviets "to crack down harder on...dissidents." Vance also warns against trying to "play off China against the Soviets." The U.S. should be more confident about Soviet competition in the Third World because Washington holds most of the cards. He opposes linking Soviet behavior in the Third World to "issues in which we had so fundamental an interest as SALT." (Garthoff, p. 601)

**May 30-31, 1978** - NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Washington, agree to a major Long-Term Defense Program incorporating plans for improving NATO forces as well as increasing real military expenditures 3 percent annually. In his memoirs, Gromyko cites this decision by NATO as one of the reasons why the United States would not have ratified SALT II even if the Soviet Union had not invaded Afghanistan. (Gromyko, p. 148; Garthoff, pp. 849-850)

**May 31, 1978** - During a meeting with Vance, Gromyko wonders if the "explosion" of anti-Soviet rhetoric in the U.S. indicates a return to a cold war environment. Vance says that the Soviet arms buildup, Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa, and human rights problems explain the deterioration in relations. The U.S. does not want a cold war, Vance says; the best way to avoid one is to make progress on SALT. Gromyko rejects charges about a Cuban role in Shaba Province and protests the briefing on SALT that Brzezinski recently gave China. He proposes a ban on any new ICBMs for the duration of the treaty. The U.S. is not interested because of plans to develop the MX. (*SALT, Cyprus*, 5/31/78; Garthoff, p. 816; Vance, p. 101)

**June 1978** - At the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (MBFR) in Vienna, the Soviets make a major concession by accepting the West's proposal for reductions to a common ceiling of 700,000 ground troops. (Garthoff, p. 765)

**June 7, 1978** - Carter makes a major speech on U.S.-Soviet relations at the U.S. Naval Academy. After stating that detente is "central to world peace," he declares that "[o]ur long-term objective must be to convince the Soviet Union of cooperation and of the cost of disruptive behavior." He strongly criticizes Soviets human rights abuses and issues a strong challenge to the entire Soviet system: "We want to increase our collaboration with the Soviet Union, but also with the emerging nations, with the nations of Eastern Europe and with the People's Republic of China. We are particularly dedicated to...self-determination and majority rule" throughout the world. "The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or-- cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice." (*Address by the President at the U.S. Naval Academy's Commencement Exercises, Annapolis, 6/7/78; Garthoff, p. 602*)

**June 8, 1978** - In an attempt to improve U.S.-PRC relations, the Carter Administration reverses an earlier decision and approves the sale of infrared scanning equipment to the PRC that was denied to the Soviet Union. (NYT 6/9/78)

**June 8-16, 1978** - ACDA Director Warnke heads the U.S. delegation to the first round of Helsinki talks on banning hunter-killer satellites. (FAC, p. 5; NYT 6/18/78)

**June 9, 1978** - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee says the Carter Administration has failed to produce evidence to support charges of Cuban involvement in Zaire. (NYT 6/10/78)

**June 12, 1978** - Vance reads a pledge by Carter not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states if they are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or do not acquire such weapons. (*Statement by the Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 6/12/78*)

**July 12-13, 1978** - Against the background of the Soviet decision to try dissidents Shcharansky and Ginzburg, Vance and Gromyko meet in Geneva to discuss SALT. Gromyko asks if the recent spate of anti-Soviet rhetoric in the United States signals a change in U.S. policy in Soviet-American relations. On SALT, lengthy discussions bring the two sides closer to overcoming a major stumbling block: whether the agreement will allow both sides to deploy one new type of ICBM (whether MIRVed or unMIRVed) during the treaty period. Vance also tells Gromyko that after the three-year protocol expires, the U.S. will keep the option of deploying the MX. Gromyko objects to any deployment of a mobile MX because of the verification problem it raises. The U.S. also presses for fractionation--that is, limits on reentry vehicles per missile, with various limits for each missile type (e.g. four for the Soviet SS-17 and ten for the MX)--but the issue is not resolved. Another contested matter is the U.S. proposal to exempt conventionally-armed cruise missiles from the agreement. The Soviets object because of the impossibility of distinguishing nuclear-armed missiles from the conventional type. The two sides also discuss limitations on the number of cruise missiles per bomber, the Backfire problem, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. On the CTB treaty, the two sides still have trouble reconciling their positions on verification and the term of the treaty. (*SALT, First Vance-Gromyko Plenary Meeting, 7/12/78; SALT, Second Vance-Gromyko*

*Plenary Meeting, 7/12/78; Vance-Gromyko Plenary Meeting, 7/13/78; Vance-Gromyko Meeting, SALT, CTB, 7/13/78; Garthoff, pp. 816-817)*

**June 13, 1978** - U.S. businessman F. Jay Crawford is arrested by Soviet police for black market currency operations. (NYT 6/14/78)

**June 13, 1978** - *Izvestia* publishes an article about U.S. diplomat Martha Peterson who a year earlier was apprehended concealing a cache of gold, money, cameras, etc. for a Soviet agent. At the time of the incident, the Soviets have not made public their decision to declare Peterson *persona non grata*. They are now making the incident public because U.S. espionage activities continue and the U.S. is wrangling with the Soviets over alleged espionage activities by Soviet U.N. employees in the U.S. (see entry for May 20). (Garthoff, p. 613)

**June 15, 1978** - Representatives from Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories brief Carter on the need for further nuclear tests and the difficulties in monitoring small Soviet detonations. This briefing leads Carter to cancel his earlier decision for a total test ban. (Garthoff, p. 757)

**June 17, 1978** - A high-ranking State Department official says the *Pravda* article detailing the fact that the present course of the United States is full of serious dangers to peace reflects a downward slide in U.S.-USSR relations. (NYT 6/18/78)

**June 17, 1978** - According to an article in *Pravda*, there has been an "acute struggle going for quite a time now in the ruling circles of the United States over detente and relations with the Soviet Union." The U.S. is "whipping up the arms race" and "deliberating worsening bilateral relations with the USSR." The "present course of the United States is fraught with serious dangers...for the entire course of development of international relations." (Garthoff, pp. 604-606)

**June 19, 1978** - Vance testifies before the House Committee on International Relations that detente is a "two way street." The future of the relationship depends on actions by both countries: "As the relationship between our two nations continues to evolve, both sides will continuously be making choices between an emphasis on the divergent elements of our relationship and an emphasis on the cooperative ones." Carter personally approved Vance's statement. (Garthoff, p. 607)

**June 20, 1978** - At the opening of the 11th Yugoslav Communist Party Congress, Tito accuses both superpowers of intervention in Africa and Third World countries. (FAC, p. 6; NYT 6/21/78)

**June 20, 1978** - In a major speech on Africa, Vance states that the presence of Soviet and Cuban troops in Africa "raises serious concerns," that apartheid in South Africa can only have an adverse impact on relations with the United States and that the United States will increase efforts to promote Zaire-Angola reconciliation. (*Address by the Secretary of State Before the Annual Meeting of the U.S. Jaycees, Atlantic City, 6/20/78*)

**June 22, 1978** - Carter issues Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM)-38 on "Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Control" calling for a review

of the pros and cons of TNF modernization and the development of options. (Garthoff, p. 858; Richelson)

**June 23, 1978** - Responding to questions about the Brzezinski-Vance relationship, U.S.-Soviet relations and Soviet attacks on Brzezinski, Carter states: "I'm the one who shapes the policy after getting advice from him and others." He comments that there is "overwhelming cooperation" between his advisers and that American policy is developed in "complete harmony." The U.S.-Soviet relationship is "stable," Carter maintains, adding that the U.S. aims at cooperation, but "we're not going to let the Soviet Union push us around." (Garthoff, pp. 607-608)

**June 25, 1978** - In Minsk, Brezhnev criticizes the United States for trying to "play China off against the USSR." (FAC, p. 6; NYT 6/26/78)

**June 26, 1978** - Soviet citizens Chernyayev and Enger are released to Ambassador Dobrynin and the Soviets agree to surrender Jay Crawford to Ambassador Malcolm Toon. (NYT 6/27/78)

**June 28, 1978** - Reporters Craig Whitney of *The New York Times* and Harold Piper of the *Baltimore Sun* are charged by Soviet radio and television with libel. (NYT 6/28/78)

**June 29, 1978** - After two U.S. reporters in Moscow are ordered to stand trial on slander charges, the State Department warns the Soviets to "reflect very carefully" on the larger implications of this matter. (Garthoff, p. 622)

**July 4, 1978** - In an address on Soviet television, Ambassador Toon soft pedals human rights. (FAC, p. 6)

**July 10, 1978** - Dissidents Anatoly Shcharansky and Alexander Ginzburg are put on trial for treason and anti-Soviet agitation. (FBIS, USSR National Affairs, 7/10/78; NYT 7/11/78)

**July 12, 1978** - Carter announces plans to review U.S.-Soviet trade, technological and scientific exchange programs. (FAC, p. 6; NYT 7/13/78)

**July 13, 1978** - In a separate session during their meeting, Vance tells Gromyko that Israel and Egypt have both put forward proposals regarding the West Bank and Gaza, and have advanced propositions for a more general declaration of principles on which to base a comprehensive agreement on the Middle East. (*Third Vance-Gromyko Plenary Meeting*, 7/13/78)

**July 13, 1978** - Alexander Ginzburg is sentenced to eight years in a labor camp for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." The next day, Anatoly Shcharansky is sentenced to 13 years in prison and labor camps for treason, espionage and "anti-Soviet agitation." (FBIS, USSR National Affairs, 7/14/78; NYT 7/14/78, 7/15/78)

**July 18, 1978** - Journalists Whitney and Piper are convicted of libel, ordered to pay a fine and print retraction within five days. They pay their fines in absentia on August 4. (FAC, p. 7)

**July 18, 1978** - Because of Soviet repression of dissidents, the U.S. government denies Moscow an export license for a Sperry Univac computer for purchase by TASS and imposes new licensing requirements for the export of equipment for oil and gas exploration. (NYT 7/24/78; Garthoff, p. 611)

**July 18-28, 1978** - The United States and the Soviet Union meet in Helsinki to discuss curbing arms sales. (FAC, p. 4)

**July 19, 1978** - After a five-year deadlock, MBFR talks recess. (FAC, p. 7)

**July 20, 1978** - Around this date, Carter is irritated when he learns that Vance and Blumenthal want new initiatives on trade with the Soviet Union and that Blumenthal favors reconsideration of the recent restrictions on trade with the Soviets. (Brzezinski, p. 325)

**July 25, 1978** - PD/NSC-36, "Nuclear Weapons Policy," is issued. The directive changes the primary objective of U.S. nuclear targeting from economic targets to military and political ones. (Richelson)

**July 31, 1978** - Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Kovalev indicts U.S. efforts to use trade "as an instrument for political pressures on the Soviet Union." (Garthoff, p. 611)

**August 15, 1978** - Alexander Podrabinek is sentenced to five years of internal exile for reporting Soviet psychiatric abuses. (FAC, p. 7)

**August 17, 1978** - In a message to the House of Representatives, Carter announces his veto of the defense authorization bill, which cuts \$800 million from military programs affecting U.S. NATO contributions. (*Message To The House of Representatives Returning H.R. 10929 Without Approval*, PPP, Vol. II, 1978, p. 1447; FAC, p. 7)

**August 25, 1978** - Ex-CIA employee William Kampiles is indicted for selling documents on spy satellites to Soviet agents in Athens. (FAC, p. 7; NYT 8/26/78)

**August 25, 1978** - Among other Senators, Robert Byrd requests that any SALT agreement be submitted as a treaty. (FAC, p. 5; NYT 8/26/78)

**September 1978** - Comprehensive test ban talks falter after Carter reverses the U.S. position by labelling small nuclear tests as "experiments" and considering them permissible under a test ban. (Garthoff, p. 616)

**September 1978** - The cabinet-level Special Coordination Committee establishes a U.S. position supporting the modernization of NATO's long-range nuclear forces. After this decision, Brzezinski meets with officials in London, Rome and Paris to ascertain European thinking. He informs the Europeans that the U.S. perceives no military necessity for modernization but will support it if it addresses European political and security concerns. (Garthoff, p. 858)

**September-October 1978** - During SALT discussions, Gromyko offers to remove the 2,500-kilometer limit on strategic ALCMs on condition that the U.S. accept a 600-



kilometer limit on GLCMs and SLCMs and on applying limits to *all* ALCMs. This, Gromyko argues, would be the only way to secure a verifiable agreement on cruise missiles. The Carter Administration becomes interested in the Soviet position. Moreover, the U.S. decides to accept Soviet assurances on the Backfire and to hold the option of developing a comparable U.S. bomber, an extended-range version of the FB-111. The two sides also agree on a Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva just before Christmas and begin to plan tentatively for a summit in mid-January 1979. (Garthoff, pp. 818-819)

**September 3, 1978** - Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) starts a six-day visit to the USSR, where he holds a secret meeting with dissidents. (FAC, p. 7)

**September 7, 1978** - Jay Crawford is convicted following a trial that began on September 5 and is given a five-year suspended sentence. (FAC, p. 7; NYT 9/8/78)

**September 7-8, 1978** - Warnke, in Moscow, tells the Soviets that the U.S. is ready for the "endgame" for SALT II, the final stage in the negotiating process. The Soviets are doubtful. The key elements in the new U.S. negotiating package are: deployment of one new type of ICBM by each side, no limits on SLBM testing and deployment, a freeze on the number of warheads carried on each type of existing MIRVed ICBM, a limit of 10 warheads on the one new ICBM allowed, a limit of 14 warheads on SLBMs and a ban on heavy mobile missiles. Warnke asks for Soviet assurance on Backfire capabilities and production rates. (Vance, p. 105)

**September 18, 1978** - The three-power meeting of the United States, Great Britain and the USSR on a comprehensive test ban, which began on January 23, resumes. (FAC, p. 5)

**September 22, 1978** - Brezhnev assails the Camp David Accords as "a separate collusion that covers up the surrender of one side and consolidates the fruits of aggression on the other," adding that the accords "can only make the situation in the Middle East even more explosive." (Sobel, p. 227)

**September 26, 1978** - Vance adviser Marshall Shulman testifies before the House International Relations Committee on the U.S. and Soviet reasons for reducing and controlling tensions. He discusses the role of differences in U.S.-Soviet perceptions in contributing to misunderstanding and tensions. Shulman reaffirms the necessity for both countries to curb politico-military competition and to establish cooperation on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the situation. (Garthoff, pp. 615-616)

**September 27-28, 1978** - At the time Gromyko and Vance hold another meeting in New York, relations are improving. Soviet dissidents are receiving lighter sentences and Jewish emigration is at its highest level. The Soviets do not object to Washington's efforts to normalize relations with China as long as they do not appear to be anti-Soviet. Gromyko insists that SALT include a strict, straight-line range limit of 600 kilometers for GLCMs and SLCMs. Vance accepts this limit because it will hold for only three years. Gromyko asks why cruise missile limitations cannot be incorporated into the treaty itself instead of just into the protocol. He also offers to remove the 2,500-kilometer limit on strategic ALCMs on the conditions (1) that the U.S. accept a 600-kilometer limit on GLCMs and SLCMs and (2) that there be limits on the total number of ALCMs and on the number of ALCMs per bomber.

Gromyko argues that is the only way to secure a verifiable agreement on cruise missiles. The two also make progress on new missile types, Backfire, MIRVing of cruise missiles, and implementation dates. Vance and Gromyko also debate the U.S. decision to end the bilateral talks on the arms race and naval deployments in the Indian Ocean area. Gromyko expresses disapproval of the Camp David agreement. (*Vance-Gromyko Plenary Meeting on SALT*, 9/28/78; Garthoff, pp. 818-819; Vance, p. 106; Carter, pp. 231-232; McLellan, p. 120)

**September 28, 1978** - The United States approves a \$56.5 million sale in oil equipment to the USSR. (FAC, p. 7)

**September 28-December 14, 1978** - The MBFR holds its winter session. (FAC, p. 7)

**September 29, 1978** - The White House produces Presidential Directive-41 (PD/NSC-41), "Civil Defense." The next document in the series, PD-42, is entitled "Civil and Further National Space Policy." Its creation date is unknown. (Richelson)

**Fall 1978** - The Soviets move to resume talks on Indian Ocean demilitarization, but the U.S. declines the offer. (Garthoff, p. 762)

**October 1978** - The Mitre Corporation's study on breeder reactors, "Nuclear Power Issues and Choices," is reviewed by Soviet officials. Their reaction is that it is a "covert attempt to slow breeder development in other countries and thereby retain the U.S. monopolistic position...." (*Soviet Views on Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation*, 10/3/78)

**October 1978** - The HLG delineates several TNF modernization options, including GLCMs, SLCMs and extended range Pershing missiles. (Garthoff, p. 859)

**Fall 1978** - Increasingly, Carter Administration officials feel that unless a SALT agreement is reached soon, the negotiations will collapse. Carter hopes that progress made at Camp David on Middle East issues will help create momentum for SALT. (Garthoff, pp. 817-818)

**October 10, 1978** - ACDA Director Warnke announces that he will resign as chief U.S. arms negotiator on October 31. Carter names retired General George Seignious as his replacement on October 20. ACDA Deputy Director Ralph Earle takes over the SALT talks in Geneva. (NYT 10/10/78, 10/21/78; Garthoff, p. 818)

**October 13, 1978** - Soviet officials Chernyayev and Enger are convicted of espionage, dismissed from the United Nations on October 19 and sentenced to 50 years in prison on October 30. (FAC, p. 7; NYT 10/15/78) --

**October 13, 1978** - Carter, Vance, Warnke and Brzezinski agree on a procedure for handling the Backfire issue. Carter insists on a written statement that the Soviets are producing 30 Backfire annually; he rejects oral confirmation because "Gromyko is a liar [and] is the only person with whom he has dealt in international affairs who is a liar." To see how the Soviets react, Warnke proposes, and Carter agrees, that the proposed letters will be given to the Soviets as "illustrative." (Brzezinski, p. 328)

**October 16, 1978** - Karol Cardinal Wojtyla of Poland is elected the 264th Pontiff and takes the name John Paul II. (Pastor, p. 268)

**October 18, 1978** - Carter announces that crucial components for a neutron bomb will be produced. (FAC, p. 7; NYT 10/19/78)

**October 21-24, 1978** - Vance meets with Gromyko in Moscow but the talks produce "little movement," according to Vance. (Vance, p. 107; Garrison)

**October 23, 1978** - The USSR tests a cruise-like missile. (FAC, p. 5)

**October 23, 1978** - Brown sends a memorandum to Carter that the Soviets are supplying MiG-23 fighter-bombers to Cuba. His purpose is to alert the President to the domestic political sensitivity of the MIGs not because they bear any special military significance. (Garthoff, pp. 618-619)

**Late October 1978** - Vance and Gromyko continue SALT discussions in Moscow. Before Vance's arrival, Warnke and Soviet negotiator Vladimir Semenov agree that missile telemetry that is relevant to treaty verification is not permissible. When Vance arrives, he tells Gromyko that the Soviets missed an opportunity to achieve a SALT agreement when Carter made his proposal to put limits on cruise missile ranges. During the discussion Semenov retracts the agreement on telemetry with Warnke and Gromyko denies that telemetry has any bearing on the treaty. The next morning, Warnke and Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko resume discussion of telemetry, with the Soviets emphasizing the legitimacy of encryption while Warnke stresses the need to restrict it. Before Vance leaves, he informs Brezhnev that Carter wants an early summit meeting. Brezhnev replies that a summit depends on settling all SALT issues. (Vance, pp. 107-109; Garthoff, p. 818)

**October 30, 1978** - The United States discloses that Cuba received up to 20 MiG-23 jets from the Soviet Union in early October. (FAC, p. 22)

**November 1, 1978** - At a news conference, Vance says there will be no arms sales to the PRC. (FAC, p. 4)

**November 12, 1978** - Carter's approval of a \$3 billion increase in funding for civil defense is disclosed. (FAC, p. 5)

**November 15, 1978** - Press leaks about the October 23 Brown memorandum on the Soviet MIGs in Cuba cause a political uproar and lead to Vance-Dobrynin meetings in which the Soviets provide assurances that the jets are not nuclear capable. (Garthoff, p. 618)

**November 16, 1978** - The United States announces that reconnaissance flights over Cuba will resume. (NYT 11/17/78)

**November 17, 1978** - Brezhnev writes to Carter concerning Iran. (Garrison)

**November 17, 1978** - Vance and Dobrynin discuss the presence of MiGs in Cuba. (NYT 11/19/78)

**November 19, 1978** - In a formal response to a warning from Brezhnev not to intervene in Iran, Vance denies any U.S. intention to do so. (FAC, p. 16)

**November 22, 1978** - Carter responds to Brezhnev's November 17 letter on Iran. (Garrison)

**November 22-23, 1978** - At the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting in Moscow, Ceausescu refuses to increase Romania's contribution to the Warsaw Pact and to sign the pro-Arab declaration. (FAC, p. 8; NYT 11/28/78)

**November 27, 1978** - Brezhnev promotes several allies at a Central Committee meeting, including Konstantin Chernenko. (FAC, p. 7; NYT 11/28/78)

**November 28, 1978** - Carter rejects a proposal by Vance, Kreps and Blumenthal for a review of U.S.-Soviet trade policy in order to lift restrictions on exports and expand economic cooperation. (Garthoff, p. 611; Brzezinski, pp. 324-325)

**November 30, 1978** - In a press conference, Carter states that Soviet authorities have provided assurances against any violation of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis settlement and that there is no evidence of any nuclear weapons in Cuba. (PPP, 1978, II, p. 1721)

**December 1978** - The U.S. turns down a Soviet suggestion to resume the suspended talks on Indian Ocean arms limitations. (Garthoff, p. 620)

**Early December 1978** - Carter Administration officials work out a method for handling telemetry under SALT. Although CIA Director Stansfield Turner strongly supports an outright ban on telemetry encryption, U.S. negotiators will simply provide the Soviets with an example of the encryption of a missile test in July that is incompatible with the U.S. interpretation of restraint on encryption. (Brzezinski, p. 329; Garthoff, p. 819)

**Early December 1978** - Plans for a SALT summit in Washington during the week of January 15, 1979 are leaked to the press. (Garthoff, p. 819)

**December 4-7, 1978** - Owing to improvements in the human rights situation, a trip to Moscow by Kreps and Blumenthal marks the end of the boycott on high-level non-arms control contacts imposed the previous summer. Kreps and Blumenthal also announce approval of sales of some of the oil-drilling equipment originally denied in August. (Garthoff, p. 615)

**December 6, 1978** - While at a ceremony commemorating the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Carter urges the Senate to ratify the 1925 International Genocide Convention. (*Address by the President Before a Group of Human and Civil Rights Leaders at the White House, 12/6/78*)

**December 8-9, 1978** - Blumenthal visits Romania. There, he reaffirms the importance to the United States of Romanian independence and friendship and expresses support for Romania's dispute with the Soviet Union. (NYT 12/9/78)

**December 14, 1978** - China conducts an atmospheric nuclear test. (FAC, p. 5; NYT 12/24/78)

**December 15, 1978** - Brzezinski meets with Dobrynin and shocks him by telling him "out of the blue" that the U.S. will, that same day, issue a communique with China announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations as of January 1. Dobrynin's "face turned kind of gray and his jaw dropped." (McLellan, p. 122; Garthoff, p. 708)

**December 15, 1978** - Carter announces that China and the United States have agreed to establish diplomatic ties on January 1. (*Joint Communique Issued by the United States and the People's Republic of China, Washington, D.C., 12/15/78*)

**December 19, 1978** - During a television interview, Carter tells Walter Cronkite that he has just received a personal message from Brezhnev that is "very positive in tone." He observes that "without any doubt our new relationship with China will not put any additional obstacles in the way of a successful SALT agreement and also will not endanger our good relationships with the Soviet Union." If the SALT talks in Geneva are successful, Carter will invite Brezhnev to come to Washington in mid-January. (NYT 12/20/78; Garthoff, p. 620)

**December 20, 1978** - Tass rebuts Carter's statement of the previous day. Brezhnev's letter did not object to the normalization of relations with China, according to the report, but it did express concern about the direction of U.S.-Chinese relations and objected to the anti-hegemony clause in the joint U.S.-China statement. In any event, the Soviets want to delay a summit until after Carter has met with Deng Xiaoping. (Garthoff, p. 620)

**December 20, 1978** - In an address to the Foreign Policy Association in Washington, D.C., Brzezinski says the SALT treaty will not weaken U.S. security, but he expresses concern over the Soviet build-up of forces in Europe and over the stability of countries around the Indian Ocean. (NYT 12/21/78)

**December 21, 1978** - The Soviets publish the full text of Brezhnev's message to Carter of December 19, which the U.S. president called "positive." The point is to show that the letter raised questions about the U.S. relationship with the PRC. (NYT 12/22/78)

**December 21-23, 1978** - Vance and Gromyko meet in Geneva where they discuss a possible summit meeting in mid-January at which a SALT agreement could be signed. New issues develop, however, that slow the completion of an agreement. Gromyko raises the question of remote-piloted drone vehicles. Vance requests authorization for agreement on two issues--one of which is encryption of missile test telemetry--resolution of which would expedite a mid-January summit. By this point, Gromyko will concede that the Soviets have the right to encrypt wherever it does not impede verification. Vance is willing to accept this formula but Carter and Brzezinski reaffirm the harder line position that was approved earlier in the month. The U.S. is demanding that the Soviets accept a compromise that would give it the right to challenge telemetry encryption under the treaty. Gromyko is perturbed by the reference in the U.S.-China communique on "mutual opposition to hegemony." He asks Vance to tell Carter that "[i]n the view of the Soviet leadership all this resembled some sort of political game on the broadest possible scale." Vance

responds that the U.S. is not aiming its China policy at anyone and that Washington would be even-handed regarding the transfer of non-military technology to China. (McLellan, pp. 120, 122; Garthoff, pp. 619, 819; Vance, pp. 110-111)

**December 27, 1978** - Carter receives a letter from Brezhnev who warns that SALT II might be jeopardized if the U.S. fails to stop its European allies from selling weapons to China. (McLellan, p. 123)

**Late 1978** - By this time, some 30,000 Soviet Jews have been allowed to emigrate, nearly double the average for the four preceding years. (Garthoff, p. 615)

1979

**1979** - Carter approves \$500 million in assistance to Poland. (Brzezinski, p. 299)

**January 1979** - During the State of the Union address, Carter invites Brezhnev to a summit meeting. (Garthoff, p. 729)

**January 1979** - At the western summit meeting at Guadalupe, Giscard d'Estaing, Callaghan, Schmidt and Carter discuss SALT and European defense issues. Schmidt promises to accept long-range TNF missiles in Germany as long as his is not the only European country to do so. He also pushes for a parallel program to negotiate arms limitations as a way to offset domestic opposition and to further detente. Giscard concurs and Callaghan offers to participate in the program. Callaghan states that it will be necessary to include European medium-range nuclear delivery systems in SALT III. (Garthoff, pp. 859-860; Carter, p. 235)

**January 1979** - A group called "Americans for SALT" announces that it will lobby for ratification of the treaty. (Garthoff, p. 730)

**January-April 1979** - While Brezhnev and Carter correspond over SALT issues, especially the encryption question, Vance and Dobrynin hold a number of meetings to resolve technical issues such as limits on missile testing and allowable number of MIRVs. In a major breakthrough, the Soviets agree that key parameters of existing ICBM types cannot be changed more than 5 percent. In return, the U.S. gives up the right to test multiple warheads on long range ALCMs, SLCMs and GLCMs during the terms of the protocol. (Vance, pp. 134-135; Garthoff, pp. 820-821)

**January 1, 1979** - The United States and China formally resume ties. (NYT 1/2/79)

**January 5, 1979** - The co-sponsor of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking trade to Soviet emigration policies, Representative Charles Vanik, says he might favor removing curbs for the Soviet Union. (FAC, p. 37)

**January 10, 1979** - Despite the improvement in U.S.-PRC relations, Brezhnev tells a group of visiting U.S. Senators that he wants to sign the SALT II accord quickly. (NYT 1/11/79)

**January 14, 1979** - Carter announces that he will send SALT II to the Senate as a treaty instead of an executive agreement. He warns the Senate that failure to sign the treaty will harm U.S.-Soviet relations. (NYT 1/15/79)

**January 17, 1979** - Carter responds to Brezhnev's December 27 letter about U.S. allies selling arms to China. (Garrison)

**January 19, 1979** - In response to Soviet SS-20s aimed at Western Europe, NATO reports that it is considering deploying new intermediate-range U.S. missiles. (NYT 1/20/79)

**January 22, 1979** - The Carter Administration's budget is released. It includes the 3 percent increase in defense spending for NATO promised in 1978 and steps to strengthen U.S. capabilities in Western Europe. (NYT 1/23/79)

**January 23-February 16, 1979** - The United States and the Soviet Union meet in Bern for the second round of ASAT talks. (Garthoff, p. 760)

**January 24, 1979** - At the invitation of the Soviet Union, the Pope meets with Gromyko. (FAC, p. 34)

**January 25, 1979** - In his military posture statement for FY 1980, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones stresses the danger of Soviet advances in strategic and conventional forces and asks Congress to support an increase in military spending to be able to match or surpass Soviet capabilities. He states that the Soviet "emphasis on military power threatens to upset the delicate balance of stability in the global power arena." (*Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1/25/79*)

**January 29-February 1, 1979** - Deng Xiaoping meets with Carter in Washington and the U.S. re-establishes full relations with the PRC. During the visit, Carter authorizes Brzezinski to begin special talks on intelligence coordination that eventually culminate in an agreement on collecting technical intelligence on Soviet missile tests. On first day of the talks, *Time* magazine publishes Deng's comments: "We must proceed from the establishment of a united front against hegemonism," that is, a united front against the Soviet Union. Also during the talks, Deng states that China is going to teach a "lesson" to Soviet-allied Vietnam. (Garthoff, p. 718-721)

**February-April 1979** - While Brezhnev and Carter correspond over SALT issues, especially the encryption question, Vance and Dobrynin hold a number of meetings to resolve technical issues such as limits on missile testing and allowable number of MIRVs. (Garthoff, pp. 820-821)

**February 1, 1979** - In a joint communique, Deng Xiaoping and Carter state that they will continue strengthening their friendly relations and cooperation and that both countries are "opposed to efforts by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or domination over others." (*Joint Press Communique Issued at Washington, D.C., by the President and the Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2/1/79; Garthoff, p. 720*)

**February 6, 1979** - At the U.N. Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the Soviet Union and six Warsaw Pact allies propose ending nuclear weapons production and gradually eliminating stockpiles. (NYT 2/7/79)

**February 9, 1979** - Harold Brown issues his annual defense report. It changes the previous policy focus, emphasizing the ability of U.S. forces to respond to any level of Soviet attack. (NYT 2/10/79)

**February 10, 1979** - The U.S. Defense Department confirms that Cuba received a Soviet submarine on February 7 and two torpedo boats on February 9. (NYT 2/11/79)



**February 15, 1979** - The United States issues a formal protest to the Soviet Union about Soviet anti-American activities in Iran. It states that such activities and the possible Soviet connection to the murder of Ambassador Dubs in Afghanistan could strain relations and delay the conclusion of SALT. (NYT 2/16/79)

**February 17, 1979** - China invades Vietnam. At the outset, the U.S. sends a note on the hot line recommending that the Soviet Union not take any steps that could worsen the situation. The U.S. indicates it would also exercise restraint. Soviet leaders respond with accusations of U.S. complicity in the incursion. (Garthoff, pp. 721, 723; Carter, p. 237)

**February 23, 1979** - White House Press Secretary Jody Powell confirms the Administration's intention to match Soviet limits on strategic weapons even if the Senate does not ratify the SALT treaty. (NYT 2/24/79)

**February 24, 1979** - Vance meets with Dobrynin and cautions against Soviet military involvement in the Vietnam conflict. (Garthoff, p. 724)

**February 26, 1979** - During his Supreme Soviet election speech, Gromyko criticizes the U.S. for "playing--to put it mildly--the 'China card'....If this is being done to pressure the Soviet Union, such attempts are futile and can only yield the opposite effect." His basic point is to warn the U.S. against Chinese exploitation of U.S. support. The same day, a Radio Moscow commentator warns against a Chinese plan to precipitate a U.S.-Soviet war. (Garthoff, p. 725)

**February 27, 1979** - The Soviets are angered by Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal's visit to Beijing during the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. (Garthoff, p. 722)

**February 28, 1979** - Brzezinski proposes to Carter that a "consultative security framework" be established for Southwest Asia as the basis for reasserting U.S. influence. This contributes to the promulgation, 11 months later, of a policy for U.S. involvement in the region that comes to be known as the "Carter Doctrine." (WP 1/24/80)

**March 1, 1979** - The State and Defense Departments announce that the listening post in Kabban, Iran, is now closed. Some officials say that this will damage the ability to verify Soviet compliance with the SALT treaty; State Department officials deny this. (NYT 3/2/79)

**March 1, 1979** - Some 2,400 U.S. scientists pledge to restrict cooperation with the Soviet Union until dissidents Shcharansky and Orlov are released. (NYT 3/2/79)

**March 1, 1979** - The Senate confirms George Seignious as director of ACDA. (NYT 3/2/79)

**March 2, 1979** - During his election speech, Brezhnev responds favorably to Carter's summit invitation and says he is optimistic about prospects for a SALT agreement. (Garthoff, p. 725)

**March 12, 1979** - It is shown that the Soviet SS-18 missile is capable of carrying 14 warheads, four more than provided for in SALT. (NYT 3/14/79)

**March 19, 1979** - Brezhnev writes a letter to Carter, complaining that the U.S. first included Moscow in the Middle East peace process (October 1977) but quickly excluded the Soviets. (Garrison)

**March 29, 1979** - Vance meets with Dobrynin to discuss the only two outstanding SALT issues to be resolved--encoding of missile-test date (telemetry) and defining new missile systems. (FAC, p. 32)

**April 1979** - Deng Xiaoping tells a visiting group of American Senators that the PRC will share intelligence with the U.S. and help monitor Soviet conformance with any future SALT agreement. (Garthoff, p. 726)

**April 1979** - NATO establishes a Special Group on Arms Control and Related Matters, chaired by the State Department director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, to develop an arms control proposal to accompany TNF modernization. (Garthoff, p. 860)

**April 1, 1979** - The CIA prepares a report on the "International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." The report assesses the strategic implications of nuclear weapons capabilities and threats in a variety of troubled geographical areas. (*International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, 4/79)

**April 4, 1979** - In an address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Brzezinski says a SALT agreement would be a good foundation for better political ties. (NYT 4/5/79)

**April 5, 1979** - In an address to the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association in New York, Harold Brown says that the SALT treaty allows for the development of Trident, MX mobile ICBM and cruise-missiles, and that the Soviet Union does not have a military advantage. He also states that SALT represents a foundation for establishing enduring political relations with the Soviet Union. (NYT 4/6/79)

**April 5, 1979** - The Conference on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR) holds its 200th session in Vienna. (FAC, p. 36)

**April 5, 1979** - The Commerce Department confirms that a \$6.8 million UNIVAC, cancelled in July 1978, was sold to the Soviet Union. (NYT 4/6/79)

**April 13, 1979** - Brezhnev writes a letter to Carter. (Garrison)

**April 16, 1979** - CIA Director Stansfield Turner says it will take five years to fully restore the intelligence capability that the base in Iran provided for monitoring Soviet missile tests and development. (NYT 4/17/79)

**April 17, 1979** - Harold Brown rejects Turner's assessment of the loss of the Iranian intelligence base, stating that the necessary capabilities will be restored in one year. (NYT 4/18/79)

**April 18, 1979** - Brezhnev and Kosygin are reelected president and prime minister of the Supreme Soviet. (NYT 4/19/79)

**April 19, 1979** - Chinese Prime Minister Deng tells a group of visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee members that the United States is free to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT from its soil. (NYT 4/20/79)

**April 23, 1979** - In Geneva, the United States and the Soviet Union begin the third round of ASAT talks, which extend to June. A fourth round scheduled for early 1980 never occurs because of the invasion of Afghanistan. (Garthoff, p. 760)

**April 23-24, 1979** - The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meets at Homestead Air force Base, Florida, to discuss the Soviet build-up in Europe. (FAC, p. 36)

**April 25, 1979** - Carter begins to campaign for the SALT II agreement with a speech to the American Newspaper Publishers Convention. He says that the SALT treaty allows for immediate verification and for flexibility in U.S. strategic options. ((NYT 4/26/79; Garthoff, p. 822)

**April 27, 1979** - In exchange for the release of convicted Soviet spies and former U.N. aides Chernyayev and Enger, the Soviet Union releases dissidents Alexander Ginzburg, Mark Dymshits, Edvard Kuznetsov, Valentin Moroz and Georgi Vins. (NYT 4/28/79)

**April 27, 1979** - Vance, Blumenthal and Dobrynin meet to discuss possibilities of increased U.S.-Soviet trade in the wake of the impending SALT II agreement. (NYT 4/28/79; Garthoff, p. 730)

**May 1979** - Pentagon planners present "Consolidated Guidance No. 8" to Brown. The guidance proposes U.S. assistance in strengthening the Chinese military strength so that China could assist the West in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, p. 750)

**May 1, 1979** - For the first time since 1968, Soviet military units march in a May Day parade. (NYT 5/2/79)

**May 2, 1979** - In testimony to the House Foreign Affairs panel, Warren Christopher discusses the guidelines that were used by the Carter Administration to apply its concern for human rights to the conduct of foreign policy. (NYT 5/3/79)

**May 3, 1979** - By a vote of 77-12, the Senate approves additional funds for the development of the mobile MX missile. (NYT 5/4/79)

**May 7, 1978** - Vance and Dobrynin resolve the remaining substantive issues on SALT including the removal of the environmental shelters covering Minuteman III silos that Ford had promised in 1974. (Garthoff, p. 821)

**May 8, 1979** - Carter aides disclose that secret U.S.-USSR "diplomatic soundings" on MBFR began in Washington in late March. (FAC, p. 36)

**May 9, 1979** - Agreement on a SALT treaty is announced. Instead of the large cuts originally sought by Carter, the agreement affirms the Vladivostok limits of 2,400, to be reduced to 2,250 by January 1, 1981. The two sides agree to a ceiling of 1,200 for MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, with the total of land- and submarine-based missiles and bombers equipped with multiple missiles not to go beyond 1320. No missiles may have more than 10 warheads and the various missile types already in existence may only carry the number of warheads with which they have previously been tested. Each side may deploy one new missile but it may have no more than 10 warheads. Modifications of existing missile types are constrained. Heavy bombers count against the total number of launchers and against the MIRVed launcher subtotal when they carry cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers. Missiles that are not allowed to be deployed may not be tested. Each side agrees to avoid measures that impede the ability of the other to verify that tests and deployments are in compliance. Encoded transmissions are banned when the coding impedes verification. Accompanying protocols ban, until December 31, 1981, the deployment of SLCMs or GLCMs with a range of over 600 kilometers. Regarding the Backfire bomber, Dobrynin and Vance agree that at the summit Brezhnev will make assurances about the Backfire's capabilities and Carter will respond with a U.S. understanding of the actual rate of production. Brezhnev will not contradict the figure which will make the production rate part of the formal negotiating record. (*Statements by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 5/9/78; Garthoff, p. 729; Smith, pp. 78-79; Vance, pp. 134-135*)

**May 30, 1979** - In an address at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Brown says that since 1962-63 the Soviet Union has been trying to develop the capability to attack U.S. land-based missiles by surprise. (NYT 5/31/79)

**Late Spring 1979** - The HLG decides to support deployment of a combination of about 200-600 Pershing II and GLCM missiles. (Garthoff, p. 861)

**June 1979** - Senator Jackson assumes leadership of the Congressional opposition to SALT II. General Edward Rowley of the Joint Chiefs of Staff resigns from the Army in order to oppose the treaty. (Garthoff, p. 732)

**June 5, 1979** - The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union resume Geneva talks on an overall nuclear test ban. (FAC, p. 33)

**June 5, 1979** - The Soviet Union tells China that the aim of the talks to be held in July or August will be normalizing relations. (NYT 6/6/79)

**June 6, 1979** - Averell Harriman briefs Carter on how to negotiate with the Soviets. He states that "Brezhnev looks on this meeting as one of the great events in his life, and has done everything possible to avoid failure" on SALT. "His deepest commitment is to keep war away from his own people." Because of the Soviet Union's poor system of exchanging information, "Brezhnev will not be adequately briefed on some of the American attitudes and concerns. It is very important that you not surprise or embarrass him....He is old, human, and emotional." Any

concession that the Soviets make will come "belatedly, and most likely from Brezhnev himself." (Carter, pp. 241-242)

**June 7, 1979** - Carter announces that the U.S. will proceed with development of the MX mobile ICBM system. Brzezinski convinces Carter to support the development of a heavier 92-inch diameter missile rather than a smaller 83-inch diameter model. He believes that the larger missile will increase chances of SALT ratification; in addition, it could carry the largest number of reentry vehicles permitted under the treaty. (Garthoff, p. 731; Smith, p. 83; Brzezinski, p. 336)

**June 8, 1979** - A Trident missile has its first successful submerged launch. (NYT 6/10/79)

**June 14, 1979** - Senator Jackson addresses the neoconservative Coalition for a Democratic Majority and announces his opposition to the SALT II treaty. Moreover, he accuses presidents since Nixon of pursuing a policy of "appeasement" toward the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, p. 731)

**June 15-17, 1979** - Carter meets with Brezhnev at Vienna, where they sign the SALT II agreement. Carter and Brezhnev agree to two points that do not appear in the text of the agreement: telemetry cannot be encrypted to evade the treaty and the Soviet Union will limit production of Backfire bombers to 30 per year. Carter provides Brezhnev with proposals for SALT III; major points include: no encryption of telemetry, conclusion of the comprehensive test ban treaty, pre-notification of missile tests, restrictions on nuclear fuel sales and a moratorium on the production and deployment of any new missiles and launchers in the context of the reductions anticipated under SALT III. Carter also proposes an annual 5 percent reduction from SALT II force levels. Brezhnev supports halting production of nuclear weapons and reducing stockpiles, but wants the nuclear delivery systems of China, France and Britain included. The summit communique mentions support for "international detente" but is the first one since 1972 not to mention the "principle of peaceful coexistence." Soviet leaders strongly argue for reaffirming the principle but Brzezinski rejects it because he believes that Kissinger had made a mistake in accepting the Soviet formulation in the first place.

In one of his statements, Carter criticizes Soviet policy in Africa and Vietnam. He also declares that improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations will not be at the expense of relations with Moscow. Regarding Afghanistan, Carter states that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union should interfere in its internal affairs. In response, Brezhnev rejects U.S. concerns about Vietnam and strongly attacks the Chinese for wanting to incite a world war. He asks that the U.S. join the Soviet Union in preventing attacks on the Afghan government. The two sides disagree over human rights issues. Brezhnev claims that human rights is not a "legitimate" item of discussion because it is so "sensitive." Carter responds that the Soviets "voluntarily signed the Helsinki accords, which made this issue a proper item in state-to-state relations." (McLellan, p. 124; Garthoff, pp. 732-740, 762; Carter, pp. 247-260; Brzezinski, pp. 340-344)

**June 18, 1979** - A White House statement asserts that Carter also supports SALT II and continued detente because of their impact in other parts of the world outside Europe. (*The White House*, PPP, Vol. I, 1979, pp. 1050-51)

**June 18, 1979** - Upon his return from Vienna, Carter supports SALT II and a renewed detente before a joint session of Congress. He argues that SALT was not a "favor we are doing for the Soviet Union" observing that it was a way to reduce the risk of war. He never mentions detente and observes that SALT II will not end U.S.-Soviet competition; "there will always be some degree of tension in the relationship." Carter says he warned Brezhnev that the Soviet backing of Cuba in Africa has a "negative impact on U.S.-Soviet relations." (Garthoff, p. 740-742; FAC, p. 53)

**June 22, 1979** - Carter transmits the SALT treaty to the Senate. (*Message From the President to the Senate, 6/22/79*)

**June 25, 1979** - As the Senate battles over ratification of SALT II, Gromyko refuses to consider further amendments or renegotiation. Any of the proposed amendments would have killed the agreement because they were not acceptable to Moscow. (Garthoff, p. 743)

**June 27, 1979** - Maintaining that the SALT Treaty is "fatally flawed," Senator Howard Baker (R-Tennessee) says he will block the treaty as it stands. (NYT 6/28/79)

**June 29, 1979** - The North Atlantic Council gives NATO's official endorsement to SALT II. (Garthoff, p. 742)

**Mid-1979** - Public opinion polls show that Carter has an approval rating of only 30 percent of the public. (Garthoff, p. 741)

**Early July 1979** - Carter accepts the Special Coordination Committee's recommendation on 108 Pershing II missile and 464 GLCMs for deployment in Western Europe. 108 Pershing IIs were proposed because the U.S. already had 108 Pershing IA launchers in Germany. 464 GLCMs would keep the total under the ceiling of 600 proposed by the HLG. (Garthoff, pp. 861-862)

**July 1979** - In his testimony on behalf of SALT II, Vance declares that no matter how competitive U.S. relations with Moscow are in other parts of the world, arms control is one area of U.S.-Soviet relations where it is in the U.S. national interest to make agreements. The treaty improves strategic stability, reassures U.S. allies and reduces the chances of proliferation. He warns that rejection of SALT II would cause "severe worsening" in relations with Moscow and would be a "terribly severe blow" to NATO. (McLellan, pp. 143-144)

**July 3, 1979** - *The New York Times* reports that a June 17 Chinese broadcast announced the successful test of a ballistic missile. (FAC, p. 33)

**July 9-October 1979** - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds extensive hearings on SALT II. (Garthoff, p. 742)

**July 11, 1979** - Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff state that they back the treaty, but want the United States to increase military spending. (NYT 7/12/79)

**July 12, 1979** - Paul Nitze testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the SALT II agreement is "unequal" in its legal and practical effects. He says that "in net terms, the strategic balance will move from a position not far from parity to one of Soviet strategic nuclear superiority." (NYT 7/13/79; WP 7/13/79)

**July 19, 1979** - Marshall Shulman briefs the North Atlantic Council on the Vienna summit. A number of permanent representatives endorse the U.S. effort and express hope that the Senate will ratify the SALT II agreement. (*June 19th NAC Briefing on the Vienna Summit, 7/19/79*)

**July 20, 1979** - Former IBM Chairman Thomas Watson, Jr. is named ambassador to the Soviet Union to succeed Malcolm Toon. (FAC, p. 38)

**July 21, 1979** - By a vote of 74-73, the Senate passes the Export-Import Control Act that sharply limits Alaskan oil sales and give the Defense Department more control over strategic imports to communist countries. (NYT 7/22/79)

**July 23, 1979** - The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) begins its hearings on SALT. (NYT 7/24/79)

**July 27, 1979** - Carter tells visiting editors that he will not increase defense spending to get the Senate to ratify the SALT treaty. (FAC, p. 33)

**July 31, 1979** - Henry Kissinger testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favoring ratification of the SALT agreement if the Senate requires military spending increases and also links future SALT talks to Soviet international restraint. (SFRS, II, pp. 159-160)

**August 1979** - By this time, work has begun on PD/NSC-43, "U.S.-China Scientific and Technological Relations." (Richelson)

**August-September 1979** - A number of Soviet dancers and figure skaters defect while on overseas tour. During one incident, which caused a furor in the Soviet Union, the U.S. detains an Aeroflot airliner for three days until it could be determined that a departing Bolshoi dancer was departing under her own free will. (Garthoff, p. 744)

**August 1, 1979** - Carter admonishes the Soviets, Czechoslovakia and East Germany for human rights restrictions "inconsistent with their pledges made at Helsinki." (Garthoff, p. 744)

**August 1, 1979** - The U.S. announces that the Soviet Union is authorized to purchase an additional 20 million tons of corn and wheat during the next 14 months. This is not a concession to the Soviet Union but does help make 1979 the best year ever in U.S.-Soviet trade. (Garthoff, p. 744)

**Early August 1979** - Vance and Brown inform the Senate that the Administration remains committed to the NATO goal of a 3 percent annual real increase in military spending. Senate critics of SALT such as Henry Jackson (D-Washington), John Tower (R-Texas) and Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) write to Carter asking for a 4-5

percent increase. Carter refuses to raise military spending merely to ratify SALT. (Vance, pp. 356-357)

**August 6, 1979** - To counter the recent growth of Soviet weapons directed against Western Europe, the United States discloses its July offer to deploy 200-600 medium-range Pershing II and cruise missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union. (NYT 8/7/79)

**August 22, 1979** - After meeting with Soviet officials and dissidents, a 14-member congressional group ends a three-day Moscow visit. (NYT 8/23/79)

**August 23, 1979** - The United States grants Bolshoi dancer Alexander Godunov asylum; his wife returns home voluntarily. (NYT 8/24/79)

**August 30, 1979** - Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin tells a group of visiting U.S. Senators that the Soviet Union is willing to limit production of the Backfire bomber to 30. (NYT 8/31/79)

**August 30, 1979** - Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) discloses that U.S. intelligence has confirmed the existence of a Soviet combat brigade on Cuba of ground forces, numbering 2,300-3,000 men. He calls on Carter to "draw the line on Russian penetration of this hemisphere." (Garthoff, p. 828)

**August 31, 1979** - The State Department announces: "We recently confirmed the presence in Cuba of what appears to be a Soviet combat unit." The announcement continues: "Elements of the unit appear to have been there since at least 1976. We estimate that it consists of 2,000-3,000 men. The unit includes armored, artillery, and infantry elements. In addition, we estimate that the Soviet maintain between 1,500 and 2,000 military advisory and technical personnel in Cuba." (*Statement Issued by the Department of State, 8/31/79*)

**September 1979** - To bolster impressions of a tough stance in relations with the Soviet Union, Carter signs PD-50, "Arms Control," which requires that any arms control proposal be consonant with military planning. (Garthoff, p. 746; Richelson)

**September 4, 1979** - Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Frank Church announces that the SALT hearings will be delayed so that the committee can investigate the reports of Soviet troops in Cuba. On the same day, Vance, Brown and Brzezinski meet to discuss possible options to Soviet activity in Cuba. (NYT 9/5/79)

**September 7, 1979** - In an interview, Carter states that SALT should be ratified on its own merits and should not be linked with Soviet troops in Cuba. (NYT 9/9/79)

**September 7, 1979** - The U.S. decides to deploy the MX missile in deceptive, multiple-launch-point mode. The mobile 200 MX launchers would move randomly among 4,600 widely spaced concrete shelters in valleys in Nevada and Utah, making it the largest construction project in history. (Garthoff, p. 746; Vance, p. 365)



**September 7, 1979** - In a televised statement, Carter requests that the Soviets respect the Administration's concern over its brigade in Cuba, even though Carter concedes that the brigade poses no danger. (NYT 9/8/79)

**September 10-27, 1979** - Vance meets with Gromyko twice and with Dobrynin six times to discuss the Soviet brigade issue. The Soviets refuse to withdraw military personnel; all they will agree to state is that they do not intend to change the status of their military training center. (Garthoff, p. 538)

**September 13, 1979** - Brzezinski prepares a memorandum for Carter stating the need for a "more assertive tone in foreign policy." Brown agrees with the paper and observes that "the President has a simplistic and naive view that the Soviet leaders are like ourselves." In his memorandum, Brzezinski writes that "[y]ou may not want to hear this, but I think that the increasingly pervasive perception here and abroad is that in U.S.-Soviet relations, the Soviets are increasingly assertive and the U.S. more acquiescent. State's handling of the Soviet brigade negotiations is a case in point. I recommend that in the future we will have to work for greater White House control." Carter comments: "Good." (Brzezinski, pp. 518, 565)

**September 17, 1979** - The United States grants asylum to two more Bolshoi dancers, Leonid and Valentina Koslov. (NYT 9/18/79)

**September 24, 1979** - Ludmila Belousova and Oleg Protopopov, the Soviet Olympic skating couple, defect to Switzerland. (FAC, p. 38)

**Late September** - Gerald Ford calls for deferring a vote on SALT until Congress approves a 5 percent real increase in military spending. (Vance, p. 365)

**October 1979** - The North Atlantic Assembly releases *Detente and Prospects*, which reaffirms earlier NATO decisions to make the pursuit of detente official NATO policy. (Garthoff, pp. 746-747)

**October 1979** - Senior NATO officials have reached agreement on the LRTNF deployment plan and the arms control approach. Belgium and the Netherlands, however, have not decided to participate. As part of the LRTNF arrangement, NATO has consented to a U.S. plan to withdraw 1,000 nuclear munitions from the 7,000 stockpiled in Europe since the 1960s. (Garthoff, pp. 863, 866)

**October 1, 1979** - Brezhnev warns NATO against creating long-range theater nuclear forces. (Garthoff, p. 745)

**October 1, 1979** - In a major televised speech, Carter discusses the Soviet brigade issue, stating again that the "presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us." He specifies a number of unilateral steps that the U.S. will undertake, including increased surveillance of Cuban and Soviet military activities. He also notes the importance of ratifying the SALT II agreement, insist again that the Senate not link the brigade to SALT. In off-the-record remarks to the press, the President states that Brown will be visiting Beijing in a few months and might discuss transfer of dual-use (civilian-military) technology to China. (*Address by the President to the Nation*, 10/1/79; Garthoff, pp. 843, 846; NYT 10/2/79)

**October 3, 1979** - A think piece by Harold Brown suggests that the United States should increase China's military potential so that China will be an ally in case of war with the Soviet Union. (NYT 10/4/79)

**October 3, 1979** - Vance reaffirms the United States' ban on the sale of arms to China, apparently to calm Soviet fears of strengthened U.S.-PRC ties. (NYT 10/5/79)

**October 3, 1979** - The U.S. Department of Agriculture announces the sale of 25 million metric tons of corn and wheat to the Soviet Union over the next year. In a separate announcement, U.S. aides disclose that Defense Secretary Brown has banned the sale of advanced computer technology. (FAC, p. 38)

**October 4, 1979** - The NATO High Level Group recommends the approval of the U.S. offer to deploy 200-600 medium-range Pershing II and cruise missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union. (NYT 10/5/79)

**October 4, 1979** - The *New York Times* reports on the Pentagon "Consolidated Guidance" paper on military aid to China (see entry for May 1979). Vance responds to the leak by declaring that "We are not going to sell arms to the Chinese." (Garthoff, pp. 750-751)

**October 5, 1979** - The Senate Intelligence Committee issues a cautiously favorable report on SALT II, saying that it will help U.S. monitoring abilities and prohibit deliberate concealment. (NYT 10/6/79; Garthoff, p. 742)

**October 6, 1979** - In a major speech at East Berlin, Brezhnev charges that the purpose of NATO plans to deny LRTNF systems in Western Europe is to "upset the balance of forces in Europe and to attempt to secure military superiority for the NATO bloc." He proposes to reduce the number of MRBMs deployed in the western sections of the Soviet Union if NATO does not deploy additional TNF systems. Brezhnev argues that the number of medium-range nuclear delivery systems in the European USSR have not increased during the 1970s and that there has been a slight reduction in the number of MRBMs, their aggregate megatonnage and the number of medium bombers. This speech marks the beginning of a propaganda campaign, carried on through December, against the NATO TNF decision. (Garthoff, pp. 864-865)

**October 7, 1979** - Brezhnev calls for separate theater nuclear force reductions and announces the unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet military personnel from East German to the Soviet Union. (Garthoff, p. 768)

**October 8, 1979** - A joint Soviet-East German communique is issued, reiterating the troop-cut offer and warning on nuclear missiles. It states that NATO plans to deploy nuclear missiles in Western Europe is a threat to detente. (NYT 10/9/79)

**October 9, 1979** - At a news conference, Carter rejects Brezhnev's TNF proposal and says that NATO should modernize its forces before discussing mutual and balanced reductions of troops and arms with the Soviets. He states that the Soviet's planned troop reductions are not constructive as they would allow the Soviets to modernize at the expense of NATO. (NYT 10/10/79; Garthoff, p. 865)

**October 10, 1979** - Carter discusses SALT ratification with the Congressional leadership. He favors the Byrd-Cranston compromise that consists of a five-year defense commitment and a provision that for SALT II to continue in effect SALT III negotiations must make discernible progress. (Carter, p. 264)

**October 11, 1979** - Brezhnev writes to Carter concerning TNF. (Garrison)

**October 11, 1979** - Senator Church issues the "understanding" that SALT would be ratified if Carter pledges that Soviet troops in Cuba are not combat-ready. (NYT 10/12/79)

**October 12, 1979** - Vance and Gromyko meet to discuss disarmament matters unrelated to SALT. (FAC, p. 33)

**October 13, 1979** - An ACDA FY 1977 report on arms spending states that the Soviet Union spent \$140 billion, the United States \$101 billion and China \$35 billion. (FAC, p. 33)

**October 14, 1979** - The Pentagon discloses the Soviet plan to increase the 2,100 nuclear warheads in Europe to 3,250 by 1985. (NYT 10/15/79)

**October 14, 1979** - West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt urges the West to accept Brezhnev's October 6 offer. (NYT 10/15/79)

**October 16, 1979** - Marshall Shulman testifies before Congress that neither Washington nor Moscow are "satisfied with the current state of our relations." He observes that "perhaps the strongest source of concern to the U.S.S.R. remains whether the United States will enter into a military supply relationship with China." Shulman also implies that the U.S. will seek Congressional approval for Most-Favored-Nation status for China without seeking the same for the Soviet Union. Regarding Afghanistan, he states that the 1978 coup "brought this previously neutralist government into close alignment with the Soviet Union." (Garthoff, pp. 751-752, 948)

**October 16-Early November 1979** - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins to debate a draft Resolution of Ratification for the SALT treaty. The committee adopts more than 20 conditions to ratification, but no amendments to the treaty. One of the conditions, proposed by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), requires that prior to ratification the President "shall affirm that the United States will assure that Soviet military forces in Cuba (1) are not engaged in a combat role, and (2) will not become a threat to any country in the Caribbean or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere." (Garthoff, p. 847; Vance, pp. 365-366)

**October 23, 1979** - Carter transmits to Congress a proclamation extending most-favored nation treatment to the People's Republic of China. (*Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate*, 10/23/79; Garthoff, p. 752)

**October 23, 1979** - Czech dissident Vaclav Havel and five others are convicted of subversion and threatened to prison terms of up to five years. (NYT 10/24/79)

**October 27, 1979** - Senator Robert Byrd is cited in *The Washington Post* as stating that before the combat brigade flap the Senate would likely have approved SALT II. Now the outcome is "problematical." (Garthoff, p. 847)

**October 29, 1979** - In response to the October 23 conviction of Czech dissidents, the United States temporarily recalls Ambassador Francis Meehan. (NYT 10/30/79)

**November 1979** - Helmut Schmidt proposes that the MBFR participants consider agreeing that the forces of no country in either alliance should comprise more than 50 percent of the total force on that side after reductions have been made. In this way, the Soviets would not have to be concerned about Bundeswehr force levels being expanded while U.S. forces are decreased, while the West would not have to worry about the Soviets taking parallel action. (Garthoff, p. 767)

**November 1979** - Carter signs PD-53 on strategic command, communication, control and intelligence. The purpose is to make a war-waging capability possible by safeguarding telecommunications facilities after a nuclear war begins. (Garthoff, p. 788)

**November 4, 1979** - Brezhnev extends his October 6 offer and proposes that negotiations begin without delay. (NYT 11/6/79)

**November 9, 1979** - By a vote of nine to six, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommends ratification of SALT II. (NYT 11/10/79; Garthoff, p. 742)

**November 15, 1979** - Carter responds to Brezhnev's October 11 letter on TNF. (Garrison)

**November 15, 1979** - PD/NSC-54, "Civil Operational Remote Sensing," is completed. (Richelson)

**November 19, 1979** - In its majority report, the Senate backs the SALT treaty as it stands, but requests an increase in arms spending. (NYT 11/20/79)

**November 22, 1979** - In Bonn, Gromyko warns NATO and West Germany against deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, saying it would threaten detente. (NYT 11/23/79)

**November 28, 1979** - In order to gain Senate support for the SALT II treaty, Carter announces the acceptance of a 5 percent rise in the arms budget over the next five years. (NYT 11/29/79)

**December 1979** - Carter decides to increase the U.S. defense budget to its highest level ever. In his memoirs, Gromyko cites this as one more reason why the United States would not have ratified SALT II even if the Soviet Union had not invaded Afghanistan. (Gromyko, p. 148)

**December 1979** - At the MBFR, Western countries make a new proposal for a multi-phase reduction of conventional forces in Europe. The Soviets view the

proposal as inequitable because of the divergence between U.S. and Soviet reductions under the proposal. (Garthoff, p. 766)

**December 4, 1979** - The Senate Armed Services Committee issues an unfavorable report on the military aspects and implications of the proposed SALT II treaty. They conclude that the treaty, "as it now stands, is not in the national security interest of the United States." (*Report from the Senate Armed Services Committee to the Senate*, 12/4/79)

**December 5, 1979** - As West Germany approves the deployment of missiles, the Soviets withdraw 1,000 tank units from East Germany to undermine the decision. (NYT 12/6/79)

**December 5-6, 1979** - At a Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' meeting in Berlin, the Pact softens its stand on missiles in Europe and calls for broad East-West disarmament talks. (NYT 12/7/79)

**December 6, 1979** - In conference, the House and Senate back the FY 1980 \$131 billion military appropriation, including \$284 million for a nuclear submarine and funds for Pershing medium-range missiles for Europe. (FAC, p. 28)

**December 10, 1979** - In a speech by Vance, which is read by Assistant Secretary of State George Vest to a West Berlin press group, the United States says it is adamant about the deployment of missiles in Europe, but that it would discuss long-range missile cuts with the Soviet Union. (NYT 12/11/79)

**December 10, 1979** - By a vote of ten to zero (with seven abstentions), the Senate Armed Services Committee recommends against ratification of SALT II, stating that without major changes, the treaty was "not in the national security interests." (Garthoff, p. 743)

**December 13, 1979** - Carter writes to Brezhnev about border issues between Kampuchea and Thailand. (Garrison)

**December 13-14, 1979** - At the NATO Ministerial Council meeting in Brussels, the Council backs missile deployment. In his memoirs, Gromyko cites NATO's decision as an additional reason why the United States would not have ratified SALT II even if the Soviet Union had not invaded Afghanistan. (Gromyko, p. 148; NYT 12/15/79)

**December 14, 1979** - In response to NATO's decision to deploy new missiles, the Soviets state that they are no longer willing to withdraw any troops from Europe and that the basis for talks on arms reductions has been threatened. (NYT 12/15/79)

**December 14, 1979** - The NATO Ministerial group expresses concern over the build-up in Warsaw Pact military strength, including Soviet theater nuclear and conventional capabilities. (*Final Communiqué of the NATO Ministerial Meeting, Brussels*, 12/14/79)

**December 16, 1979** - The White House discloses a letter from 16 Senators which asks that the vote on SALT be postponed until after the 1980 presidential elections. (NYT 12/17/79)

**December 16, 1979** - Pentagon aides confirm that the USSR is building its first nuclear aircraft carrier. (FAC, p. 33)

**December 20, 1979** - In Vienna, the West rejects a plan by which the United States would remove 13,000 and the Soviet Union 30,000 troops from Central Europe. (FAC, p. 36)

**December 22, 1979** - Brezhnev responds to Carter's December 13 letter regarding Thai border issues. (Garrison)

**December 26, 1979** - The Soviet Union carries out a 150-plane airlift of troops and field equipment into Afghanistan. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter says that the Soviet military build-up on the border of Afghanistan has reached the equivalent of five divisions. (WP 12/27/79)

**December 27, 1979** - The U.N. General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to "deplore the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan." In the months following the Soviet invasion, Carter embargoes the export of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union, stops the sale of computers and high-tech equipment, boycotts the 1980 Olympics to be held in Moscow and withdraws the Salt II Treaty from the ratification process in the Senate. He also announces a new policy later dubbed the Carter Doctrine, which states that any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault against the vital interests of the United States. (Bhasin, pp. 72, 137-138)

**December 28, 1979** - Members of Carter's Cabinet meet at the White House to consider the future of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A preliminary decision is made to send Warren Christopher to consult with President Zia of Pakistan. Plans are also made to further enhance U.S. cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Egypt regarding Afghanistan. It is decided to send a strong message of protest to Brezhnev on the hotline. (Brzezinski, p. 429; Garthoff, p. 949)

**December 28, 1979** - Carter sends Brezhnev a message on the hot line stating that the invasion of Afghanistan is a "clear threat to the peace" and "could mark a fundamental and long-lasting turning point in our relations." He urges quick withdrawal of Soviet forces and a halt to intervention in Afghanistan's internal affairs. (Carter, p. 472)

**December 30, 1979** - Responding to Carter's message of two days earlier, Brezhnev states that he has sent Soviet troops to Afghanistan in response to requests from Kabul. The troops will withdraw when "the reasons which prompted the Afghan request to the Soviet Union disappear." Reportedly Carter sees the response as "devious" and an insult to his intelligence. A few hours later, during a television interview, Carter says that this "action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my own opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything

they've done in the previous time I've been in office." (Brzezinski, p. 429; Garthoff, pp. 949-950)

**Late 1979** - As part of the CBT talks, the U.S. proposes to establish, for verification purposes, a seismic station at the Soviet reactor center at Obninsk. (Garthoff, p. 758)

**Late 1979** - The U.S. and China reach agreement on establishing intelligence collection facilities in China for observing Soviet missile tests. (Garthoff, p. 719)

1980

**Early 1980** - The Soviets accept the U.S. proposal to establish a seismic station but the U.S. has to backtrack because the tightening up of technology transfer after the invasion of Afghanistan prevents shipment of the seismographs. (Garthoff, p. 758)

**January 1980** - Bilateral U.S.-Soviet arms talks and anti-satellite ASAT weapons negotiations cease after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Garthoff, p. 969)

**January 3, 1980** - Carter asks Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd to delay consideration of the SALT II treaty because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Carter later writes that the invasion was "the worst disappointment to me personally" because of the impact on SALT. (*Letter from the President to the Majority Leader of the Senate*, 1/3/80; Smith, p. 224; Carter, p. 473)

**January 4, 1980** - In an address to the nation, Carter denounces the Soviet invasion of the "small nonaligned sovereign nation of Afghanistan" as a "callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter." He announces that he has requested the Senate to defer consideration of SALT II and outlines a series of other steps the Administration will take in response to the Soviet action. Among these are embargoes on exports of grain and high technology to the Soviet Union. In addition, the U.S. will delay opening any new U.S. or Soviet consular facilities, curtail Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters and provide Pakistan with military and economic assistance "to defend its independence." (*Address to the Nation by the President*, 1/4/80)

**January 5-9, 1980** - Harold Brown travels to Beijing to discuss security matters with the Chinese government. According to one report, "the secret part of his agenda deal[s] primarily with Afghanistan." Brown refuses to provide any details of possible joint actions, however. He does add later, however, that China and the United States have "taken [a] big step in strategic relations." (WP 1/10/80; Brzezinski, p. 424; CT 7/22/81)

**January 14, 1980** - In an interview with *Time* magazine, Brzezinski says that Soviet military action in Afghanistan has "imposed a severe strain on detente" and has had an "adverse impact" on SALT II. He also states: "Without SALT, the world could be confronted by a more acute arms race between the two superpowers." (*Replies by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to Questions Asked at an Interview with "Time,"* 1/14/80)

**January 23, 1980** - In his State of the Union address, Carter stresses the major significance of U.S.-Soviet relations to world peace. The relationship has "not been a simple or a static relationship. Between us there has been cooperation, there has been competition, and at times there has been confrontation." At present, the United States' basic purpose is to lead other nations "in meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet power." Carter also describes a "regional security framework" for the Gulf, which later becomes known as the Carter Doctrine. (WP 1/24/80; Sen Gupta, p. 101; Brzezinski, p. 443)



**February 20, 1980** - Soviet Politburo member Mikhail Suslov accuses Carter of "directly violating his promises and assurances" over the SALT II treaty (which Carter has refused to submit for ratification in the Senate). (WP 2/21/80)

**March 1, 1980** - Central Committee official Valentin Falin observes that it was inconsistent for Carter to play up the Soviet threat and then expect the Senate to ratify SALT II. (Garthoff, p. 825)

**March 3, 1980** - In a speech before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Vance states that "our relations with the Soviet Union have been and will be essentially competitive." Nevertheless, he states that it is not in the U.S. interest "even during a period of heightened tensions, to dismantle the framework of East-West relations constructed over more than a generation." (Garthoff, pp. 968-969)

**March 10, 1980** - The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 takes effect. (CRS4, p. 11)

**March 20, 1980** - The Soviet Union refuses to resume negotiations over rules for implementing provisions of SALT II. Soviet negotiators announce in Geneva that they will not continue discussions since Carter has refused to place the treaty before the Senate for ratification following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The talks have been recessed since December. (WP 3/21/80)

**April 21, 1980** - Vance submits his resignation to Carter based on concerns arising from the planned hostage rescue attempt in Iran. The resignation is to take effect after the mission, which is set for April 25. (McLellan, pp. 160-161)

**May 16, 1980** - Muskie and Gromyko meet in Vienna for three hours but make no progress toward resolving the crisis in Afghanistan. Regarding the meeting, Gromyko writes in his memoirs: "Everything Muskie said confirmed that the Carter administration was drifting in the direction of raising world tension, sharpening Soviet-US relations and widening the gulf between us on nuclear issues." (Gromyko, p. 296; WP 5/17/80)

**June 1980** - Carter signs PD-58, aimed at preserving the continuity of government during wartime--especially the security of the National Command Authorities. (Garthoff, p. 788; Richelson)

**Mid-June 1980** - Shortly before Schmidt leaves for Moscow to meet with Brezhnev, Carter worries that the Chancellor is taking a softer position on TNF deployment. He sends him a tough letter that Schmidt characterizes as "astonishing." (Garthoff, p. 868)

**June 20, 1980** - Carter warns U.S. allies in Europe against the "false belief" that they can maintain detente with the Soviet Union while Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan. Carter strongly disputes Moscow's argument that Soviet actions in Afghanistan should not damage the essential "fabric" of detente. "The Soviets must understand that they cannot recklessly threaten world peace or still enjoy the benefits of cooperation while pursuing a policy of armed intervention," Carter insists. (NYT 6/21/80)

**June 23, 1980** - The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party asserts that the "rapprochement between aggressive circles of the West, above all the United States, with the Chinese leadership is taking place on an anti-Soviet basis, hostile to peace. The partnership of imperialism and Peking hegemonism is a dangerous new phenomenon in world politics..." (Garthoff, p. 988)

**June 24, 1980** - Muskie concedes that, in light of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and Senate hostility to SALT II, prospects for further arms control are "diminished." (Basic Documents, p. 216)

**July 1980** - At the MBFR talks the Eastern delegations take up Schmidt's proposal (see November 1979 entry above) that no participant have more than half of the total level of conventional forces for its alliance. They also are willing to consider special steps to assure that forces withdrawn are not restored. In addition, the Eastern delegations reply to the Western proposal of December 1979 (see above) by calling attention to unilateral Soviet reductions of 20,000 troops and call for initial Soviet reductions of 20,000 and 13,000 by the U.S. (Garthoff, p. 767)

**July 7, 1980** - Responding to a question about the linkage of SALT II and Afghanistan, Muskie states: "I think we had a fighting chance of getting ratification before the invasion of Afghanistan...I can't conceive of being able to rally support of the Senate to achieve ratification of SALT II unless there is a significant change in Soviet behavior." (*Replies by the Secretary of State to Questions Asked at a Question-and-Answer Session Following an Address before the Foreign Policy Association, 7/7/80*)

**July 19 - August 3, 1980** - The Soviet Union hosts the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. (Terry, pp. 80-81)

**July 25, 1980** - Carter signs Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), which outlines a counter-vailing nuclear strategy. It is immediately leaked to the press. The directive represents an effort to synthesize the acquisition of strategic forces and strategic nuclear doctrine on the basis of a war-fighting capability and concept. (Garthoff, p. 789; Richelson)

**August 20, 1980** - In a speech at the Naval War College, Secretary of Defense Brown supports the development of a "countervailing," or war-fighting, nuclear strategy to counter the perceived Soviet war-fighting strategy. (Garthoff, p. 789)

**September 16, 1980** - To quell Soviet fears that the new countervailing strategy provides for a U.S. first strike capability, Muskie states that it "does not signify a shift...to a first strike doctrine. It does...strengthen the credibility of our capability to retaliate against any nuclear attack..." He also states that the strategy is consistent with the SALT II treaty and arms control goals (i.e., it is mainly for deterrence). (*Statements by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9/16/80*)

**September 25, 1980** - Muskie and Gromyko meet in New York and agree to hold talks on TNF arms control in mid-October. (Garthoff, p. 868)

**October 1980** - At the MBFR talks, the West responds to the Eastern bloc proposal of July (see above) by stating that agreement on the data base was necessary before agreement was possible on the exact size of reductions in the first phase. (Garthoff, p. 767)

**October 14, 1980** - Muskie remarks that the Soviets are linking their behavior in Afghanistan to the hard-line approach taken by the United States toward them, including the Senate's rejection of the SALT II treaty and the escalation in defense expenditures. (*Remarks by the Secretary of State at a Press Briefing, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 10/14/80*)

**October 16-November 17, 1980** - A preliminary series of TNF arms control talks takes place in Geneva. The talks lead nowhere because of diametrically opposed positions. The U.S. position, based on a NATO agreement, is to limit talks to land-based LRTNF ballistic missile systems, such as Soviet SS-4, SS-5, SS-20, the Pershing II and GLCM systems, excluding all sea-based and aircraft systems on both sides and including only U.S. and Soviet systems. The Soviets want to include all U.S. FBS and to take into account French and British nuclear strike forces when setting levels for U.S. forces. The Soviets propose lower levels for the U.S. than for the Soviet Union on grounds of "equality" and "equal security" for the Soviet Union in relation to all Western nuclear strike forces. (Garthoff, pp. 868-669)

**November 4, 1980** - Ronald Reagan overwhelmingly defeats Carter in the presidential election. (NYT 11/4/1980)

**December 7, 1980** - Carter sends a hot-line message to Brezhnev concerning the CIA's report of December 5 that the Soviets will invade Poland. Carter warns of the serious consequences that would follow such an action. He also states that any intervention would merit the transfer of advanced weaponry to the Peoples Republic of China. The Soviets do not respond. In addition, the White House issues a statement reaffirming the position presented in its December 3 statement. (Situation in Poland, White House Statement, 12/7/80); Cynkin, p. 72)

**December 12, 1980** - Brzezinski sends a memo to Harold Brown entitled "Weapons for China," asking for DOD evaluation of possible weapons sales to China as a sanction taken against the Soviets. (Orbis, p. 48)

**Late 1980** - Both delegations in the CBT talks have instructions not to raise the issue of seismographic stations unless the other one does. (Garthoff, p. 758)

1981

**January 1981** - Carter signs PD-62, which represents a further development of the war-fighting ideas embodied in PD-59 (see entry for July 25, 1980). (Garthoff, p. 788)

**January 1981** - In his final report to Congress, Brown declares that Soviet military spending "has increased steadily and significantly by an average of 4-5 percent a year...The Soviet trend has continued even as the rate of growth in Soviet GNP has declined." In actuality, according to Garthoff, after 1976 Soviet military spending increased only 2 percent annually. (Garthoff, p. 795)

**January 20, 1981** - Ronald Reagan is inaugurated the 40th President of the United States. (WP 1/21/81)

KEY TO CITATIONS

A number of declassified and unclassified documents from the collections of the National Security Archive appear in this chronology. They are cited by title (in italics) and date of origin. Where no title exists, Archive staff have provided descriptions of the documents' contents, which appear in brackets. Other citations have been abbreviated as follows:

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**CRS2** = Congressional Research Service. *Chronology of Highlights of the Evolution of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy from Atoms-for-Peace through President [sic] Reagan's First Term*. Prepared for the Minority Staff Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government Processes, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. April 9, 1986.

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**CT** = *Chicago Tribune*

**Cynkin** = Cynkin, Thomas H. *Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.

**FAC** = *Foreign Affairs Chronology: 1978-1989*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990.

**FBIS** = Foreign Broadcast Information Service

**Garrison** = References provided courtesy of Mark Garrison.

**Garthoff** = Garthoff, Raymond. *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985.

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**Kornienko** = References supplied courtesy of Ambassador Georgi Kornienko

**McLellan** = McLellan, David S. *Cyrus Vance*. New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985.

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**Vance** = Vance, Cyrus. *Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983.

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**WP** = *Washington Post*